The End of the (Virtual) World by Fairfield, Joshua A.T.
Volume 112 Issue 1 Article 6 
September 2009 
The End of the (Virtual) World 
Joshua A.T. Fairfield 
Washington & Lee University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Bankruptcy Law Commons, Computer Law 
Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joshua A. Fairfield, The End of the (Virtual) World, 112 W. Va. L. Rev. (2009). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss1/6 
This Digital Entrepreneurship: The Incentives and Legal Risks is brought to you for free and open access by the 
WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law 
Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact 
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
THE END OF THE (VIRTUAL) WORLD
Joshua A. T Fairfield
I. IN TROD UCTION .................................................................................. 53
II. B ACKGROUN D ................................................................................... 55
A. Lessons from the Dot-Corn Bust ........................................... 55
B . Virtual W orlds .................................................................... 57
1. The Rise of Virtual Worlds ..................................... 57
2. What Are Virtual Worlds? ................... .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . . . . . 58
3. The End of the World ............................................. 60
C. The Business of Game Finance and Secured Lending .......... 65
IIi. VIRTUAL ASSETS IN BANKRUPTCY ................................................... 69
A. Intellectual Property ............................................................. 69
1. Security Interests in Intellectual Property ............... 69
2. Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy .......... 70
a. Section 365 and Executory Contracts ............... 72
b. Assumption and Assignment: Exclusive and Non-
Exclusive Licenses ................................................. 74
c. Enforcement of Intellectual Property Licenses
under 365(n) .......................................................... 76
B . Virtual Property ................................................................... 81
C. ToySmart and Customer Lists ............................................ 87
1. T oySm art ................................................................. 88
2. Section 363(b)(1) .................................................... 89
IV. CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................ 92
V . C ON CLU SION ...................................................................................... 95
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtual worlds have been the next big thing for some time now. In
2008, more than 100 public virtual worlds received venture capital funding - a
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significant increase over previous years.' Yet virtual worlds have been going
bankrupt faster than ever, including several high-profile firms and worlds.2
Every technology goes through a shakedown phase, and for virtual worlds the
current recession has served as a catalyst for a downturn that, although not un-
expected, is nevertheless startling in both numbers and rapidity.
This article examines the intimate relationship between how a virtual
world begins life and how it ends. The amount of money available to creditors at
the end of a company's life, based on the bankruptcy system, helps to determine
the terms of loans that creditors are willing to make. If creditors are able to get
money out of a bankrupt virtual world, then virtual world creators may be able
to borrow money at lower interest rates in order to start new projects.3 This
Article asks whether permitting virtual world creators to borrow against new
kinds of valuable intangible assets will decrease borrowing costs. It therefore
argues that how virtual worlds die will impact how they are born.
The piece first addresses the lessons learned in the early-millennium
dot-coin bubble burst and applies them to the shakedown currently underway in
virtual worlds. It shows that during the dot-com burst, creditors learned ways to
get money out of intangible assets because thinly-capitalized dot-coins had no
other assets of value. The Article extends this trend to virtual worlds. Certain
new intangible assets (called "virtual property") could and should be available
to businesses as collateral for secured lending. Virtual property is often treated
by the markets as personal property - for example, digital objects are bought
and sold for real dollars and could serve as valuable collateral if law were clari-
fied.4
The law of security interests in intangibles is clearer in some places than
others. Although complex, the rules for perfecting, enforcing, and valuing secu-
rity interests in patents, copyrights, and trademarks are now established.5
U.C.C. Article 9 has expanded the ability of secured parties to secure interests in
software that is physically embedded in goods or that is delivered via a tangible
medium such as a CD-ROM (under the definitions of "goods" and "software"
respectively).6 Thus, when intellectual property is embedded in a good or deli-
I See Dean Takahashi, Game and Virtual World Fundings Reach $9368 Million in 2008,
VENTUREBEAT, Apr. 26, 2009, http://games.venturebeat.com/2009/04/26/second-revision-game-
and-virtual-world-fundings-reach-935-million-in-2008.
2 See infra Section 11; see also Takahashi, supra note I ("Many of these companies may shut
down because of the recession.").
3 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1559
(2004) ("Securitized debt often has a lower interest-rate cost than corporate debt because it pro-
vides a new source of financing, the capital markets, whose rates are systematically lower than the
rates at which many companies commonly borrow.").
4 Many virtual worlds, such as Second Life, EVE Online, and Project Entropia operate flou-
rishing economies for players to buy and sell virtual goods for real money.
5 See infra Section ILIB.
6 See U.C.C. § 9-102(44), (75) (2008) (defining "goods" and "software" respectively).
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vered in tangible form, courts have little difficulty differentiating the chattel
property right from the intellectual property right.
But neither bankruptcy law nor Article 9 deals well with security inter-
ests in copies (not in copyrights) of software that are solely in electronic form. 8
In the area of intangible or electronic assets, courts often do not distinguish
rights in a specific copy (a personal property right) from copyrights (an intellec-
tual property right).9 Many virtual world creators and businesses hold assets
such as digital inventory, virtual currency, or prime virtual real estate. In order
for those businesses to be able to borrow against this virtual property, the law
must be significantly clarified. This article therefore advocates a theoretical
overhaul of how courts value and understand digital assets in the bankruptcy
context. Courts can, it suggests, apply established principles of law to permit
game designers to borrow against virtual assets, and creditors to maximize their
recoveries in bankruptcy.
The article will proceed in three parts. Part II will discuss the back-
ground of intangibles in bankruptcy and the burgeoning technologies of virtual
worlds. Part III will analyze the legal impact of digital objects and intellectual
property licenses in virtual world bankruptcies, with an eye toward determining
whether increased protection for creditors might result in reduced borrowing
costs for virtual world creators. Finally, Part IV will offer some recommenda-
tions for how courts can redefine the way they understand digital assets in the
bankruptcy context so as to resolve the ambiguities clouding the use of these
important emerging property rights as collateral.
I. BACKGROUND
This section will examine the lessons of the dot-com bust, describe vir-
tual worlds as a technology and as a business, and then detail the business of
videogame finance, and how it might make use of a secured debt business mod-
el.
A. Lessons from the Dot-Corn Bust
At the turn of the millennium, the technology sector underwent a signif-
icant shakedown. Much of the investment in Internet startups was equity, and
both venture capitalists and regular investors lost money when the tech bubble
7 See infra Section II.B.
8 See infra Section IV.
9 See Lois R. Lupica, The Technology Rich 'Dot-Coni' in Bankruptcy: The Debtor as Owner
of Intellectual Properly. 53 ME. L. REv. 361, 363 (2001) ("[A] party seeking to use intellectual
property as collateral is caught in the intersection of intellectual property law and Article 9
with very little direction as to which way to turn.").
2009]
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burst.'0 But creditors - even secured creditors - of dot-coms were also hard-
hit. Dot-coms did not have many conventional assets.11 As a result, bankrupt
dot-coms had difficulty liquidating cash and forming an estate from which they
could repay some money to creditors. Troubled dot-coms did, however, have
significant intangible assets: intellectual property, domain-name registrations,
customer lists, and other valuable Internet real estate.1 2  These intangibles
proved to be of significant value to creditors. 13 As a result, intangibles have
played an increasing role in securing loans for information-technology business-
es. Creditors have loaned against code, URLs, and customer lists, in addition to
the usual payment intangibles and accounts receivable, which have long been
stock-in-trade for secured lenders.14
The valuation of such assets was often difficult.1 5 Accurate valuation
depends on a relatively thick market for sales.16 Innovative Internet startups had
no market to point to when their intellectual property reached the auction block.
These valuation problems were compounded by the speed at which the market
was developing.1 7 By the time a bankrupt dot-corn was sold off, the value of its
intellectual property generally declined dramatically because of other market
entrants, or because technology had evolved past the original business plan of
the dot-com.1 8




13 See Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 134
(1999) ("Software is a relatively new type of business asset, but already has taken on a central role
in all sectors of the economy; when any asset brings such a crucial value to businesses, the desire
for lending based on that asset cannot be far behind.").
14 See infra Section IlI.C.
15 See Lupica. supra note 9, at 382 ("While issues of valuation are always difficult in bank-
ruptcy, when the collateral at issue is intellectual property, unique issues are raised.").
16 See Weston Anson, Valuing Trademarks, Patents and Other Intangibles in a Bankruptcy
Environment, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 29 (1996); Kevin G. Coleman, Nanotechnology Company
Valuation, 2 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & Bus. 376 (2005); Bradley J. Sklar & W. Todd Carlisle, The
Alabama Limted Liability Company Act. 45 ALA. L. REV. 145. 217 (1993) ("However. in many
closely held firms, accurate valuation may be difficult or impossible without a sale of all of the
assets."): Note, Federal Estate Tax and the Right of Publicity: Taxing Estates for Celebrity Value,
108 HARV. L. REV. 683, 688-92 (1995) (discussing methods of valuing intangible assets).
17 See Lupica. supra note 9 at 381 ("Even if some of the problems concerning the ability to
sell certain types of intellectual property in the course of a bankruptcy are overcome, there may
not be a ready market for intellectual property sold at a 'fire sale' where a 'going concern' value
may no longer be relevant. Intellectual property is potentially time-sensitive, particularly with
respect to new technologies and there is the potential for early obsolescence as even newer tech-
nologies are developed.").
18 See id. ("Accordingly, in many cases, sales of 'dot-com' assets in connection with reorgani-
zations and liquidations of 'dot-com' businesses may be problematic or in other cases, impossi-
ble."): see also Robert Brady. Sean Beach & Karen B. Skomorucha, Determining and Preserving
the Assets of Dot-Corns, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 185 (2003).
[Vol. 112
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Despite these problems, intangibles became a valuable source of colla-
teral, and a growing number of cases discussed the methods for perfecting and
enforcing security interests in intellectual property and other intangibles, or in
the transfer of such IP during the IP-licensor's bankruptcy. 19 Creditors' accep-
tance of these forms of collateral set the stage for the next step in the evolution
of online assets, as the Internet matured from two-dimensional webpages to
three-dimensional virtual worlds.
B. Virtual Worlds
Virtual worlds represent the next iteration of Internet technologies: the
Internet in 3D. The rise of the technology has been accompanied by enormous
entrepreneurial activity, and as with any paradigm-shifting technology, there
have been significant successes and spectacular failures. The following sec-
tions detail the rise of the virtual world, what virtual worlds are, and several
instances of high-profile virtual world bankruptcies.
1. The Rise of Virtual Worlds
Virtual worlds began in 1978 with pure text, in Richard Bartle and Roy
Trubshaw's Multi-User Dungeon.20 They rapidly improved to two-dimensional
graphical interfaces, then to two-a-half ("isometric") and then three dimensional
worlds. Despite this rapid evolution, virtual worlds have only truly entered the
mainstream in the past decade with the breakout success of Blizzard Entertain-
ment's World of Warcraft. Modern virtual worlds have many different business
models. Some virtual worlds are in-house corporate or military simulators "be-
hind the firewall.",21 Others are open commercial worlds, where anyone can join
the world for the price of a license. 2 Others are freeware or "freemium," in
23which entry is free, but premium services come at a price. Still other virtual
worlds are based on a microtransactions model, in which users purchase digital
24objects and rent or buy digital spaces from the virtual world creators . There is
19 See infra Section I.C. See also Mann, supra note 13, passim (instead of relying on security
interests in IP to repay debt in the event of foreclosure, banks developed symbiotic relationship
with venture capital firms to provide lower-cost loans for software development).
20 See E-mail from Richard Bartle to Alan Cox (Nov. 15, 1990, 19:00:55 GMT). available at
http://www.mud.co.uk/richard/mudhist.htm.
21 See Katherine Noyes, The Business Case for Virtual Business, Part 2, LINUXINSIDER. June
30. 2009, http://www.linuxinsider.com/story/The-Business-Case-for-Virtual-Business-Part-2-
67464.html.
22 See, e.g,. World of Warcraft, http://signup.worldofwarcraft.com/menu.html (last visited
Sept. 13, 2009).
23 Second Life, for example, offers free membership to all, but premium users get a weekly
stipend of Linden dollars as well as the right to own land. See Second Life's Membership Plans,
http://secondlife.com/whatis/plans.php (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
24 Second Life also utilizes this model. See id.
2009]
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nothing new about these phenomena: personal homepages are merely in the
process of becoming virtual personal homes. What is new is the reach and pe-
netration of the technology, with currently tens of millions of users of virtual
worlds in the United States alone 5
Virtual worlds have become big business. In 2007, game and virtual
world companies raised $613 million.26 In 2008, 112 game companies raised
nearly a billion dollars in venture capital or angel investment, out of a total 2
billion that went into media and entertainment companies altogether.27 The rate
of funding of social and virtual worlds therefore accelerated right up to the cur-
rent recession. This funding was in part due to the now-mainstream popularity
of virtual worlds like World of Warcraft or Lord of the Rings Online (whose
parent company, Turbine, secured $40 million in one year alone for develop-
ment of massively multiplayer online roleplaying games 28), but also to the
spread of virtualization concepts and technologies outside of the traditional
framework of virtual worlds.
2. What Are Virtual Worlds?
Virtual worlds are a combination of social networking technology and
video game graphics, used to create a shared, persistent environment in which
users can interact. Although the technology often looks game-related, and the
most famous virtual worlds are games, there is significant crossover, because
the same technology can be used for multiple functions. Virtual worlds are used
for military simulations, education, police training, medical diagnosis and
treatment, sex, gambling, banking, architecture, e-commerce, high fashion, so-
cial interaction, creative development, programming, and good old-fashioned
29entertainment.
The multiple uses of virtual world technology are important in the bank-
ruptcy context because technology created for one purpose - say, a game -
can be repurposed to another. Buyers can, therefore, increasingly be found for
30the technologies developed by soon-to-be-defunct virtual world's creators.
25 See Virtual World Factsheet. http://www.incredibleinternet.com/virtual-worlds/factsheet
(last visited Sept. 4. 2009).
26 Id.
27 Takahashi, supra note 1.
28 See Turbine Secures $40 Million in Financing, TURBINE PRESS RELEASE, June 4. 2008,
http://www.turbine.com/news/5-press/62-turbine-secures-40-million-in-financing.html. See Yo-
Ville's website, http://www.yoville.com (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
29 For example. Linden Labs' Second Life serves thousands of purposes, including entertain-
ment, creative, social, commercial, educational, military, political, and financial applications. See
generally F. Gregory Lastowka and Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds. 92 CAL. L. REv.
1 (2004) (discussing different uses for virtual worlds); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85
B.U. L. REV. 1047, 1059 (2005) [hereinafter Virtual Property] (same).
30 See infra note 47. and accompanying text.
[Vol. 112
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss1/6
THE END OF THE (VIRTUAL) WORLD
The market for virtualization technology will continue to expand as the technol-
ogy finds uses outside of the traditional video-game context. Many virtual
world applications are overlays on the two-dimensional Internet. For example,
one application in Facebook called YoVille creates a virtual world over Face-
book.3 ' Another application, called Just Leap In, creates a three-dimensional
overlay, turning 2D webpages into 3D.32 Thus, those who wish to use a two-
dimensional Internet may continue to do so; those preferring a three-
dimensional environment may access the same content. Virtual worlds are even
moving out of computers and onto mobile devices, and out of virtual spaces
entirely and into realspace, with the help of augmented reality devices and three-
dimensional barcodes that permit virtual objects to exist and interact with people
who remain in the real world.33
Of particular interest are virtual currency and the trade in digital objects,
because these provide the interface point between virtual and real economies.
Facebook is testing virtual currency.34 Chinese internet service provider Ten-
cent used a virtual currency, the QQ coin, to become the largest Chinese suppli-
er of digital goods.35 The trade in virtual objects and currency has been subject
to significant criticism by gainers and regulatory efforts by governments. For
example, China has recently imposed controls on virtual currency that purport to
halt the cashing out of virtual currency for real dollars 6  Because these virtual
assets are both misunderstood and quite valuable, they represent an opportunity
for academics and practitioners seeking to find ways to lower the cost of capital
to virtual world companies, as well as trustees, bankruptcy counsel, or bank-
ruptcy judges seeking to maximize the recovery of creditors in a virtual world
bankruptcy.
31 See YoVille's website, supra note 28.
32 See Just Leap In's website, http://www.justleapin.com/about us (last visited Sept. 13,
2009).
33 See, e.g., Parallel Kingdom, http://www.parallelkingdom.com/Default.aspx (last visited Oct.
16. 2009): The Hidden Park. http://www.thehiddenpark.com/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2009); see also
Erick Schonfeld, Mobile Data: IBM Tags Wimbledon with Seer Android, WASH. POST, June 23,
2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/06/
23/AR2009062303057.html.
34 See Alex Pham, Facebook Mulls over Adding Virtual Currency as Coin of its Social Realm,
L.A. T~iES, Mar. 24, 2009, available at
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2009/03/facebook-gdc-vi.html; see also MG Siegler,
It's Heeerrre: 'Pay With Facebook' Is In The Wild, TECHCRUNCH, May 29, 2009.
http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/05/29/its-heeerrre-pay-with-facebook-is-in-the-wild.
35 Yuan Faces Virtual Threat from QQ Coin, THE MALAYSIAN INSIDER. July 2. 2009,
http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/index.php/business/31137-yuan-faces-virtual-threat-from-
qq-coin.
36 The regulation is designed to be "one way" only, so that microtransaction business models,
in which companies sell virtual items or currency for real dollars is still permitted; but the pur-
chasers then ostensibly cannot cash the currency back out. See John D. Sutter, China Restricts
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3. The End of the World
This section explores the various ways in which virtual worlds have
gone out of business, and the potential market for re-use of the technology de-
veloped by a soon-to-be defunct entity. Virtual world startups have much in
common with the Internet startups of the late 1990s. Some virtual world com-
panies seem to have thin asset bases because they invest in creating intangibles,
rather than building factories and warehousing inventory.
Virtual worlds have as many ways of going out of business as any other
company, as well as a few new ones. A virtual world may be a company itself,
and turning off the servers may be contemporaneous with a bankruptcy filing or
receivership. 37 A virtual world project may continue during the bankruptcy and
38reorganization of its parent entity. Or a virtual world may be a project of a
healthy company that is cancelled for failure to realize sufficient revenue.39
Virtual worlds that fail have various fates. The underlying intellectual
property and customer lists may be sold off in bankruptcy. 40 The world may be
either sold to or abandoned to the fans, who re-create the world in their own
41 42time. 1 The world may simply be switched off, never to return. Worlds may
fail before they even begin, as companies make business decisions to pursue
other products.43
The deaths of virtual worlds have implications beyond the companies
that create and maintain them. There are companies that exist within virtual
worlds, to sell virtual goods or services (or advertise real goods or services with-
37 Faketown, for example, shut down the world when its parent company, Identity Play, filed
for bankruptcy. See Faketown Closes Due to Bankruptcy; Technology Up for Auction, VIRTUAL
WORLDS NEWS. July 28. 2008, http://www.virtualworldsnews.com/2008/07/faketown-closes.html.
38 See Aortel Filing for Bankruptcy Protection; Web.alive Development Uninterrupted,
VIRTUAL WORLDS NEWS, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.virtualworldsnews.com/2009/01/nortel-filing-
for-bankruptcy-protection-webal ive-development-uninterrupted. html.
9 NCSoft's Tabula Rasa, Electronic Arts' Earth and Beyond, and Google's experiment, Live-
ly, all fall into this category.
40 See Tom Magrino. Hellgate: London Closing January 31, GAMESPOT, Oct. 24, 2008,
http://uk.gamespot.com/news/6199996.html (describing the financial troubles of Hellgate's crea-
tor, Flagship Studios); see also Interview: Lessons from Faketown, VIRTUAL WORLDS NEWS, July
29, 2008, http://www.virtualworldsnews.com/2008/07/interview-lesso.html (stating Faketown's
bankruptcy and pending auction for the site).
41 See Myst Online: Uru Live website, http://www.mystonline.com/en (last visited Sept. 13,
2009). Google Lively has unofficially taken this route too, as a group of active programmers have
undertaken recreating the Lively world. See NewLively website, http://www.newlively.com (last
visited Sept. 4, 2009).
42 See Edward Castronova, Financial Cost of E&B's Closure, TERRA NOVA, Mar. 22, 2004,
http://terranova.blogs.com/terra nova/2004/03 /financial cost .html.
43 See, e.g., Steve Butts, Mythica Cancelled, IGN.COM Feb. 12. 2004, available at
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in the virtual world).4 4 Some businesses trade in virtual land or goods.45 Some
sell or lend virtual currency for real dollars.4 6 The death of a virtual world has a
ripple effect beyond its own existence, as the businesses that used the virtual
world must relocate, reorganize, or fail.
The first and simplest form of virtual world bankruptcy is one in which
the world is more or less synonymous with the company that created it. For
example, on June 23, 2008, Identity Play, Inc., creator of the virtual world Fake-
town, filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.47 Assets of the debtor included the web-
sites, the intellectual property underlying the Faketown virtual world (including
trademarks, trade names, source code, and graphics) and the customer user da-
tabase. 4  The trustee solicited bids from 19 potentially interested parties, of
which five expressed an interest in purchasing the soon-to-be-defunct virtual
world. 49 The entire virtual world was sold for $20,000 to FooMojo, an Internet
startup that focuses on creating virtual pets.50  The case was particularly
straightforward because of two factors - first, an explicit clause in Faketown's
privacy policy that permitted sales of customers' personally identifiable infor-
mation in the event of bankruptcy;5' and second, the absence of secured par-
ties."
44 See generally SUE MARTIN MAHAR & JAY MAHAR, THE UNOFFICIAL GUIDE TO BUILDING
YOUR BUSINESS IN THE SECOND LIFE VIRTUAL WORLD (2009).
45 See Robert D. Hof, My Virtual Life, Bus. WK., Cover Story, May 1, 2006, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06 18/b3982001.htm.
46 See Michael Learmonth, Virtual Real Estate Boom Draws Real Dollars, USA TODAY, June
3, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/internetlife/2004-06-06-virtual-
reality x.htm ("All goods and services in the game can be transacted in either Linden or U.S.
dollars. One entrepreneur and Second Life player runs a currency exchange."); see also Tycoons
Buy in to Virtual Worlds, PHYSORG.COM, May 10, 2007, available at
http://www.physorg.com/news98006532.html ("Virtual banks, therefore, provide funds for play-
ers who need money to grow their holdings but don't want to sell their belongings to fund those
ventures.").
47 See Voluntary Petition, In re Identity Play, Inc., No. 2-08-bk-19025-ER (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
June 23, 2008).
48 Id. at *10.
49 Id.
50 See Order Approving Motion for Order Authorizing Sale and Assignment of Property of the
Estate Free and Clear of Liens and Claims, and Approving Bidding Protection, In re Identity Play,
Inc., No. 2-08-bk-19025-ER (Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 23, 2008).
51 Faketown's Privacy Policy, http://web.archive.org/web/20070806223559/http://
www.faketown.com/privacy.php (last visited Sept. 13, 2009) ("In the Event of Merger, Sale or
Bankruptcy. In the event that Faketown is acquired by or merged with a third party entity, we
reserve the right, in any of these circumstances, to transfer or assign the information we have
collected from our users as part of such merger. acquisition. sale, or other change of control. In the
unlikely event of our bankruptcy. insolvency, reorganization, receivership, or assignment for the
benefit of creditors, or the application of laws or equitable principles affecting creditors' rights
generally, we may not be able to control how your personal information is treated, transferred, or
used.").
52 See In re Identity Play. Inc.. supra note 13.
2009]
9
Fairfield: The End of the (Virtual) World
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2009
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Secured parties and other entities with an interest in the virtual world
may complicate matters. Flagship Studios, developer of the virtual worlds Hell-
gate: London and Mythos, experienced development delays and liquidity prob-
lems in early 2008. . Flagship then entered into an innovative financing agree-
ment with a Texas bank, Comerica, which extended Flagship a credit facility
secured by Flagship's distribution and sales rights in Hellgate: London. The
credit facility was based on the model of financing for independent films.
5 4
The arrangement, though groundbreaking, did not ultimately permit
Flagship to survive. Three months later, Flagship laid off nearly all em-
ployees.55 Although Flagship claimed that it was not entirely defunct, industry
consensus was that the company had closed its doors.56 To complicate matters,
HanbitSoft, Hellgate: London's distributor for Asia, asserted through U.S. law-
yers that it was the owner of Mythos under prior arrangement with Flagship, and
that it reserved its rights to continue operation of Hellgate: London in Asia pur-
suant to its exclusive license agreement for that area.57 HanbitSoft also claimed
that it had offered, and Flagship Studios had refused, additional cash infusions. 58
What followed was not clear. Flagship seems to have made no bank-
ruptcy filing, and the company is listed as "active" in the California corporate
records. 59 Hellgate: London ceased operation in the United States in February
of 2009.60 The principal claimants in Flagship's IP, HanbitSoft and Comerica
Bank, seem to have reached an accommodation. T3 Entertainment, a Korean
games publisher, purchased a controlling interest in HanbitSoft, and began ad-
vertising for developers to work on Hellgate: London and Mythos in Korea.
61
T3 Entertainment has since announced that Hellgate: London will be reopened
53 See Stuart Bishop. We Ballsed Things up with Hellgate, Roper Admits, CVG, Feb. 25, 2008,
available at http://www.computerandvideogames.com/article.php?id 183206.
54 See Comerica Bank Finances Flagship Studios, IGN, Mar. 26, 2008,
http://pc.ign.com/articles/862/862223p1.html.
55 See Chris Remo, Layoffs Confirmed at Hellgate Developer Flagship, GAMASUTRA, July 11,
2008, http://www.gamasutra.com/php-bin/news index.php?story= 19386.
56 See Andrew Burnes, Flagship Studios' Closure Confirmed, All Staff Fired, All I.P. Lost, but
Now the Studio is Saved.', July 12. 2008, http://ve3d.ign.com/articles/news/39866/Flagship-
Studi os-CIo sure-Confirmed-AI I-Staff-Fired-AI -- P-Lost-But-Now-The-Studio-Is-Saved.
57 See Matt Warner, HanbitSoft CEO Claims Ownership Rights to Hellgate:London and My-
thos, MASSIVELY, July 14, 2008, http://www.massively.com/2008/07/14/hanbitsoft-ceo-claims-
ownership-rights-to-hellgate-london-and-my.
58 See Sol Invictus, HanbitSoft: "Flagship is Selfish and Irresponsible, " HELLGATE GuRu.
July 16. 2008. http://hellgateguru.com/2008/07/hanbitsoft-flagship-is-selfish-and-irresponsible.
59 See California Business Search, http://kepler.sos.ca.gov/list.html (type "Flagship Studios" in
the corporation search bar and click "Search" - the company was listed "active" when last vi-
sited on Sept. 13, 2009).
60 See Magrino, supra note 40.
61 See Simon Carless, Report: T3 to Continue Hellgate, Mythos Development in SF Office,
GAMASUTRA, July 31, 2008, http://www.gamasutra.com/php-bin/newsindex.php?story 19658.
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62
as free-to-play in Asia. Moreover, Kee Young Kim, CEO of HanbitSoft, has
claimed on the publisher's English-language website that HanbitSoft now owns
the Hellgate: London intellectual property, suggesting that a deal for the sale of
63the intellectual property was reached with Comerica.
Coming full circle, HanbitSoft and T3 Entertainment have announced
their desire to relaunch Hellgate: London in the West but claim that the distribu-
tion agreement between Flagship and U.S. distributor Namco Bandai prevents
64them from opening the Korean servers to U.S. and European players. The
Mythos developers have since reformed as Runic Studios and are developing the
property for T3 Entertainment, and - particularly interesting - a U.S. release
is contemplated, supported by a development studio set up by the Korean com-
panies in the U.S., under the rubric of Redbana U.S.
65
Other virtual worlds have gone through several different iterations ra-
ther than being sold off for scrap or partitioned among business partners. Uru:
Ages Beyond Myst, a massively multiplayer sequel to the bestselling Myst series,
suffered development delays, but was kept alive by fans and hosted on player-
66maintained "shards" for several years. The Uru fan base was particularly loy-
al, and scholars have studied the "Uru Diaspora," in which fans of Uru re-
created their environment and communities in other virtual worlds, including
There. corn and Second Life. After Uru was taken offline, it was sold to Ga-
meTap, which resurrected the game for a period during 2007.6' GameTap then
69
took the game offline in 2008, for lack of subscriptions. Cyan (Uru's devel-
oper) then reacquired the rights to the game, and has proposed bringing Uru,
now called the Myst Online Restoration Experiment (or MORE) back for a third
incarnation as an open source fan-fueled project.
70
62 See Leigh Alexander, HanbitSoft: Hellgate London to Continue as Free-to-Play Title,
GAMASUTRA, Jan. 26, 2009. http://www.gamasutra.com/php-bin/news index.php?story 22005
[hereinafter Hellgate London to Continue].
63 See Invictus, supra note 58.
64 See Hellgate London to Continue, supra note 62.
65 See Leigh Alexander, Interview: T3's Redbana Launches Western Dev, Publishing Office,
Talks Rescuing Audition. GAMASUTRA, June 23. 2009, http://www.gamasutra.com/php-
bin/news index.php?story 24066.
66 See Nathaniel Berens, The Ending has not yet been Written, THE ESCAPIST, Nov. 6. 2007,
http://www.escapistmagazine.com/articles/view/issues/issue-122/2598-The-Ending-Has-Not-Yet-
Been-Written.2.
67 See Celia Pearce, Identity-as-Place: Fictive Ethnicities in Online Games & Virtual Worlds,
Address at MIT Comparative Media Studies Spring 2009 Colloquium Lecture Series (synopsis
available at http://gambit.mit.edu/updates/2009/02/nowguest-starringcelia-pearc.php) (last
visited Sept. 13, 2009).
68 See Daniel Terdiman, Online Game Rising from the Dead, CNET NEWS, May 18, 2006,
http://news.cnet.com/Online-game-rising-from-the-dead/2100-1043 3-6073611 .html.
69 See Charles Oynett, Myst Online is Discontinued, IGN, Feb. 4, 2008,
http://pc.ign.com/articles/ 849/849518p1.html.
70 See Myst Online, supra note 41.
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Thus far, this section has discussed cases in which the virtual world and
the company involved are more or less synonymous - often the case when the
company is a startup or when the virtual world is a company's flagship product.
Virtual assets are important in other forms of business as well. One emerging
model is that of a company within a virtual world. Companies operating inside
virtual worlds like Second Life sell everything from avatars to fashion to bank-
ing to sex." Thus, a virtual world meltdown could impact the companies that
call the world home, or the bankruptcy of an important in-world company could
impact other companies, or even the virtual world itself. For example, Anshe
Chung, the widely touted first virtual world real-dollar millionaire, made her
money as a virtual land baron. 2 The virtual land owned by Chung was worth
real money. If someone like Chung were to go bankrupt, the virtual assets
would likely be the most valuable asset of the estate. Moreover, her bankruptcy
would have still further downstream effects on Chung's virtual world tenants,
which themselves may be prominent businesses.
Although no bankruptcy case has yet dealt with an entirely in-world ent-
ity, there have been multiple costly and high-profile business closures in virtual
worlds. In 2007, Ginko Financial, a bank in Second Life, suffered a rapid de-
cline and dissolution following game god Linden Lab's decision to ban gam-
bling. 3  Ginko had promised up to 40% interest rates, and has subsequently
been accused of operating as a Ponzi scheme. Depositors demanded their
money, and Ginko rapidly dissolved, leaving many creditors empty-handed,
saddled with a net loss of $750,000.75 Although Ginko Financial appeared to
have no assets for creditors upon its dissolution, it is easy to imagine in-world
companies that would. For example, real-world banking licenses have been
issued to companies that operate in the virtual world Project Entropia; 76 it is not
at all implausible that a virtual bank could someday dissolve under circums-
tances that would leave some assets for creditors.
71 See Stefanie Olsen, Storefronts in Virtual Worlds Bringing in Real Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
7, 2008. available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/08/technology/internet/
08virtual.html.
72 See Anshe Chung Studios website, http://acs.anshechung.com (Anshe Chung, real name
Ailin Graef, describing her virtual assets and climb to virtual success).
73 See Bryan Gardiner, Bank Failure in Second Life Leads to Calls for Regulation, WIRED.




76 A real-world banking license has been granted to Mindark, the creator of Project Entropia,
and from that license, it has issued "sub-licenses" to users within the world to create in-game
banks. See Online Game gets Banking Licence, BBC NEWS, Mar. 20, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7954629.stm; Wolfgang Gruener, Virtual Bank License for
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In a similar fashion, real-world companies have been investing in virtual
assets. For example, IBM has spent millions of dollars developing its online
real estate in Second Life." The IBM Welcome Center and other facilities on
the IBM islands in Second Life are corporate assets like any other, and could be
sold off to satisfy creditors in the event of IBM's bankruptcy. Although virtual
assets are currently quite a small portion of the overall assets of a real-world
company, the amount and value of virtual assets are likely to grow over time."
C. The Business of Game Finance and Secured Lending
This spate of virtual world failures raises the question of whether enter-
prising lawyers can help virtual world entrepreneurs find new ways to secure the
capital they need for virtual world projects. This sub-part will examine the
business of game finance and the business of secured lending, to determine what
changes in law are likely to produce cheaper access to development funds for
virtual world creators.
The most common method of game funding is venture capital and equi-
ty finance. 79 This makes sense, as many game developers, especially virtual
world developers, have only recently set up shop. The game industry has not
made as much use of debt finance as other, more established, areas of creative
endeavor, such as movies or music catalogs.80 Video games, like most software,
often have a short shelf-life, meaning that even a wildly successful game may
not serve as good collateral." The flash-in-the-pan nature of game profits does
77 See Stephen Baker, IBM on Second Life: More than PR, Bus. WK., Nov. 15, 2006. available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/the-thread/blogspotting/archives/2006/1 /ibm on second l.html.
78 See Mark Wallace, The Game is Virtual. The Profit is Real., THE N.Y. TIMES. May 29,
2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/29/business/yourmoney/
29game.html?r-l&pagewanted 1 ("The value of the average player's transactions, if converted to
real money, is more than $1.000 a year and has been growing nearly 25 percent a month.") (quot-
ing Philip Rosedale, founder of Second Life).
79 See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen. Commercial Law Collides with Cyberspace: The Trouble with
Pelfection Insecurity Interests in the New Corporate Asset, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 37, 40
(2002) ("[M]ost. if not all, the e-deals were equity-based investments, not secured transactions as
in the Old Economy."); see also Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 134, 137 (1999) ("Because the commercial development of new software prod-
ucts ordinarily is a risky endeavor, the typical software developer must rely on angel investors or
venture capitalists.").
80 See, e.g., Hewson Chen, Don't Sell Out, Sell Bonds: The Pullman Group's Securitization of
the Music Industry, an Interview with David Pullman, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 161, 161-64
(2000) (describing development of music catalog securitization, including the music catalogs of
James Brown and David Bowie).
S See Greg Costikyan, Death to the Games Industry. PowerPoint Demonstration,





Fairfield: The End of the (Virtual) World
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2009
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
not produce the kind of regular and predictable revenue stream that banks prefer
to service a loan.82 Further, many developers cede a large block of rights to the
publisher, in order to get the game on the market.83 Thus, a developer may not
have much in the way of collateral to back a loan.
However, as the video game industry matures, debt financing may well
increase.8 4 Established companies with track records for profitability will better
be able to convince banks to make loans. Further, game expansions and up-
dates serve to smooth out the flash-in-the-pan nature of software shelf-life, and
permit companies to reassure banks that the loan will be repaid.
8 6
e+shelf+life&cd l&hl en&ct clnk&gl us (stating that the average shelf life is less than four
weeks for a video game).
82 Volatility is of concern in the music business as well, and songs with a longer earning span
are better for bond offerings than are quick successes. See Phyllis Furman. Rock Solid Invest-
ment? David Pullman Has a Big New Deal Brewing for Musicians, Oct. 26, 1998,
http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/money /1998/ 10 26/1998-10-
26 rock solid investment david.html.
83 See Eric Zimmerman, A Game Developers' Bill of Rights (Nov. 21, 2005),
http://www.gamasutra.com/features/20051121 /zimmerman 01.shtml (defining the "First
Amendment" as "[t]he right to full ownership of what we fully create" and the "Fifth Amend-
ment" as "[t]he right to a fair and equitable share of profits derived from a game"). See also E.
Scott Johnson & Jonathan M. Holda, 1P and the Video Game Developer, Bar Bulletin, Maryland
State Bar Association (2007), available at
http://www.msba.org/departments/commpubl/publications/bar bult/2007/sep/developer.asp (out-
lining the rights of a developer and the transfer of those rights); Video Game Industry, Wikipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Video game industrypractices#Practices ("Video game industry
practices are similar to those of other entertainment industries (e.g. the music recording industry),
but the video game industry in particular has been accused of treating its development talent poor-
ly.") (last visited Sept. 13. 2009).
84 This would track maturation in the software industry broadly. where debt financing has
evolved a symbiotic relationship with traditional venture capital finance. See Mann, supra note
79. at 137 ("[L]enders also have found a profitable role for debt [in software financing]."). In-
deed, the videogame market may be more profitable for secured lending than music in the long
term. See Chen, supra note 80, at 163 ("[T]he music business is a limited market .... But if you
can get to the software companies, then this could be a huge business." (quotations omitted)).
85 See Patricia A. McCoy, The National Business Judgment Rule in Banking, 44 CATH. U. L.
REV. 1031, 1044 (1995) ("New business loans present undeniably high levels of risk, at least
insofar as repayment depends on operating revenues. For this reason, courts have split over the
propriety of loans to start-up ventures, both recently and in the past. This split reflects conflicting
philosophies as to appropriate judicial techniques for managing the inherent risk in new business
loans.").
86 See, e.g., Paul Hyman, Video Game Companies Encourage 'Alfodders,' THE HOLLYWOOD
REP., http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/search/article display.jsp?vnu content id=
1000484956 ("In the typical scenario, even if a game is a mega-hit, within eight to twelve months
on the store shelves, it's gone. But, in the case of 'Half-Life,' our revenue stream increased year
after year for the first three years of the game's life. I attribute a lot of that to three mods [expan-
sions] ...."); Christopher Riley. The Need for Software Innovation Policy. 5 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 589. 616 (2007) ("[T]he video game industry is characterized by a particularly
short shelf life .... ").
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Virtual worlds in particular may be able to take advantage of debt fi-
nancing. Virtual worlds have longer useful lives than most software. Ultima
Online, one of the first graphical virtual worlds, opened its doors in 1997 and is
still in operation.8 7 Virtual worlds are also unlikely to be supplanted by sequels.
Sequels for virtual worlds tend to do poorly because the player base of a com-
pany must give up its investment in the original world to transition to the follow
up. Thus, even high-profile sequel worlds (for example, Everquest Ii and Ashe-
ron's Call II) have done poorly compared to the success of the originals. 88
In addition, virtual world license fees provide a regular, steady income
stream to service a loan. Players do not buy the software once. 89 Rather, they
make periodic (often monthly) license payments. Players are likely to keep pay-
ing these license fees because they are locked in to virtual worlds and cannot
leave with their virtual property and the communities they have come to value. 90
While traditional game developers must compete on an open market with each
subsequent title, a virtual world provider can essentially hold the property and
communities that a player develops in-game hostage, ensuring the monthly
payment of a license fee. 9 1
Successful virtual world creators expand the original world rather than
replace it. For example, game developer Mythic Entertainment expanded its
virtual world Dark Age of Camelot and eventually migrated its entire user base
to an updated client, such that it was able to drop support for the game client as
first shipped.92 Similarly, virtual world titan Blizzard Entertainment has contin-
ued to expand and upgrade its virtual world World of Warcraft over the five
years that the game has been open.93 Today's game experience uses technology
87 See Ultima Online's Tenth Anniversary Announcement, http://www.uoherald.com/tenth
(last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
88 See Kyle Homer, On the subject of risky MMO sequel, May 3, 2008,
http://www.massively.com/2008/05/03/on-the-subject-of-risky-mmo-sequels (enumerating the
lesser showing of sequels to Everquest, Asheron's Call, and Lineage). See also Brendan Drain,
Should MMOs have sequels? June 11, 2008, http://www.massively.com/2009/06/11/should-
mmos-have-sequels.
89 Although there is some variation on this point. For example, the virtual world Guild Wars
does not rely on monthly fees, but instead relies on sales of expansion packs. Dungeons & Dra-
gons Online has just moved from a monthly fee schedule to a "freemium" model. However, the
monthly license model remains the most successful among U.S. virtual worlds.
90 See Vivendi Games, Introduction to Vivendi Games, Investors' Report filed with Securities
and Exchange Commission 15 (June 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datalI 127055/000095012306007628/y22210exv99w1.htm
("Advantages that accrue to highly successful [virtual worlds include] high consumer switching
costs the player has to leave their characters and friends!").
91 See id.
92 See Sanya Thomas, 1. 73F Farewell, Classic Client!. Nov. 8. 2004,
http://www.camelotherald.com/news/news article.php?storyid 1776 (noting that the original
"Classic" client will no longer function after the 1.73 expansion patch).
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entirely unavailable at launch. Moreover, due to the need to patch, update, alter,
and adjust the virtual world on an ongoing basis, virtual world providers are
more likely to reserve to themselves rights in intellectual property that could
serve as valuable collateral.
Further, like independent film financing efforts, virtual world providers
are likely to have overseas licenses similar to film pre-sales. These overseas
transactions may provide a baseline for valuing the game as collateral for a loan.
Unlike many video games, virtual worlds are national (rather than internationall)
phenomena because many are locally hosted.94 The community nature of play
means that language matters; and "lag," or low response between the player's
computer and the game server, is best reduced by having local servers. As a
result, virtual world providers often seek local partners for overseas markets.95
Once the value of the license has been established by successful transactions,
the developer has a starting point for valuing the game as collateral.
The development of a clear legal framework for dealing with virtual as-
sets is also likely to be useful for banks and regulators. Banks lend on estab-
lished cash flow. 96 But collateral matters because banks seek as many routes to
repayment as possible, especially where a project is untried or innovative. The
more novel the project, the more clarity (and collateral) a bank will desire.
Regulators also are influenced by collateral, and the opinions of regulators nec-
essarily impact banks. A bank will wish to appear fully secured on a loan to
avoid a regulator's suggestion that the bank keep additional reserves due to the
riskiness of the transaction. 97 Such suggestions can have significant influence
on a bank, even in the absence of any formal enforcement action.
In sum, established lenders will be most comfortable working from their
experience in project finance in other fields. 98 Equity funding will remain popu-
lar. But as the games industry matures and reputations and profits increase,
banks will be more willing to offer debt finance. Developers may retain suffi-
cient rights to themselves to act as attractive collateral. And while the volatile
nature of software sales in general may prevent banks from offering debt
finance to game developers, the longer term, more stable nature of virtual
worlds may provide greater predictability to banks. What is needed above all is
94 See Mia Consalvo, Localization Meets Culturalization, Mar. 5, 2008,
http://terranova.blogs.com/terra-nova/2008/03/localization-me.html.
95 See Aleister Kronos, Second Life Brazil Launches 23rd April, Apr. 14, 2007,
http://www.3pointd.com/20070414/second-life-brazil-launches-23rd-april.
96 See Linda Gorman, Bringing Racial Quotas to Bank Lending in Colorado, INDEPENDENCE
INST., May 23, 1996, available at http://www.i2i.org/main/article.phparticle id=474 ("[B]ank
lending depends on credit history, cash flow, financial strength, the industry a business is in, colla-
teral, size, and the quality of management.").
97 See 12 C.F.R. § 560.160(b) (2009) (requiring banks to classify assets and "establish ade-
quate valuation allowances or charge-offs, as appropriate, consistent with generally accepted
accounting principles and the practices of the federal banking agencies.").
98 See Comerica Bank Finances Flagship Studios, supra note 54.
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a stable set of rules for perfection, priority, enforcement, and treatment in bank-
ruptcy for these assets, so that banks can be sure what they are getting if they
should decide to take a security interest in virtual assets as collateral. The fol-
lowing section addresses these issues.
III. VIRTUAL ASSETS IN BANKRUPTCY
An example may prove useful to anchor the following discussion on the
treatment of various types of assets related to virtual worlds in bankruptcy. Sup-
pose a business in a virtual world, called PixelDolls, sells digital clothing to
players in the world. 99 Players purchase digital clothing with virtual currency,
and then wear the clothing on their avatars. If PixelDolls were to go bankrupt,
there would be three distinct categories of assets available for creditors (or, be-
fore bankruptcy, PixelDolls might use these assets as collateral). First, intellec-
tual property - the copyrighted bitmaps, wireframes, etc. - that represent the
creative effort in making the clothes. Second, there would be intangible non-IP
assets, or "virtual property," that would consist of the virtual currency held by
the business, its digital inventory, and the virtual real estate on which the busi-
ness operated. The third asset would be the customer service lists and informa-
tion that PixelDolls gathered about its customers. This section discusses each
type of intangible asset in the context of bankruptcy and virtual worlds.
A. Intellectual Property
There are two distinct issues for the treatment of the intellectual proper-
ty that inheres in virtual worlds. The first is how security interests in intellectual
property are created pre-bankruptcy; the second is how intellectual property
licenses are treated in bankruptcy. The following sub-parts discuss these rules
as well as applications to the specific context of virtual worlds.
1. Security Interests in Intellectual Property
The rules for perfection of security interests in the intellectual property
inherent in software are nonsensical but stable enough to merit brief mention.
Generally, a lender may take a security interest in the intellectual property inhe-
rent in software by concluding a security agreement with the debtor and proper-
ly filing a financing statement covering the intellectual property in software as a
"general intangible. 10 0
99 This example is based on a real business that has gained a significant following in the vir-
tual world Second Life. See Pixeldolls, http://pixeldolls.wordpress.com/.
1oo See In re Peregrine Ent., 116 B.R. 194 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that section 205 of the
Copyright Act preempts the UCC); Lupica, supra note 9. at 367 72 (outlining the preemptive
nature of copyright and patent law over the UCC, but not trademark law). See also Kenneth N.
Klee & David A. Fidler, Recent Developments Concerning Intellectual Property and Bankruptcy,
SK092 ALI-ABA 355 (2005) (discussing the interplay between the UCC and intellectual property
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The fighting question is whether state (Article 9) or federal (Copyright
or Lanham Act) filing systems must be used to give notice to subsequent lenders
that the intellectual property is encumbered. Security interests in unregistered
copyrights and trademarks must be filed with the state UCC filing office, gener-
ally the Secretary of State.1° Security interests in federally registered copy-
rights must be filed with the Copyright Office. 112 State filings are sufficient to
perfect security interests in patents against subsequent lenders, but a federal
filing is necessary to prevent a subsequent purchaser from priming the bank's
security interest.10 3 These rules have been subject to many articles and much
debate. 10 4 All that can be said for them is that they currently seem generally
accepted, and stability perhaps trumps sanity in law.
For a virtual world game god or for the owner of a business that oper-
ates inside a virtual world, these rules are most often of concern when a general
intangibles collateral description in a security agreement sweeps the copyrights,
patents, and trademarks of a company into the hands of a foreclosing lender.
These collateral descriptions are common, and thus issues of intellectual proper-
ty will crop up often in bankruptcies. The most important components of creat-
ing a security interest in intellectual property are attention to possible issues of
federal preemption (which, as above, sometimes necessitate dual filing) and
careful description of the intellectual property interest encumbered in the securi-
ty agreement.
2. Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy
This section examines what happens to the web of intellectual property
licenses within a virtual world when the world or a business inside it goes bank-
rupt. Bankruptcy Courts are likely to treat interests in avatars, accounts, and
law); Juliet M. Moringiello, False Categories in Commercial Law: The (lr)relevance of
(In)tangibility. 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119 (2007) [hereinafter False Categories] (discussing the
notion of tangibility with respect to property rights).
101 See In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
security interests in registered copyrights are governed by federal procedures. but security interest
in unregistered copyright are perfected by state UCC filing). See also Marjorie Chertok & Warren
E. Agin, Restart.Com: Identifying, Securing and Maximizing the Liquidation Value of Cyber-
Assets in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 255, 268-69 (2000) (discussing
methods for perfecting interests in developing software by securing an interest in the underlying
copyright); and In re Avalon Software Inc., 209 B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997) ("This court
holds that a product to which a copyright attaches, such as computer software, acquires its charac-
ter as 'copyrightable' when the intellectual work is created.") rev'd on other grounds by In re
World Auxiliary Power.
102 In re Avalon Software Inc., 209 B.R. at 522.
103 In re Cybernetic Services, Inc., 252 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming Bankruptcy Appel-
late panel determination that state law filing was sufficient to perfect security interest, but noting
that such a secured party would be required to yield to a subsequent assignee of the patent right
under federal law).
104 See, e.g., False Categories, supra note 100.
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other virtual assets as intellectual property licenses.' Game gods typically own
much of the intellectual property that makes up the world itself, and license this
content to players. By contrast, players that run businesses in virtual worlds can
own intellectual property interests in user-generated content that they license
back to the game world and to their customers.
Different virtual worlds offer different regimes governing user-
generated content. Open worlds like Second Life or There.com permit users
varying abilities to create and retain IP rights.10 6 Closed worlds like World of
Warcraft or Eve Online do not permit user-generated content.10 7 Some worlds,
like NCsoft's City of Heroes, are in between - for example, users can create
content with the City of Heroes Mission Architect, but immediately convey
those intellectual property interests to the game world creators.108
If a virtual world files for bankruptcy, players may seek to retain their
rights under their licenses, or the game god may seek to retain its licenses in
user-generated content. Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code permits the trustee
to assume or reject executory contracts. 10 9 A rejection by the trustee relegates
the non-debtor to an unsecured claim for that breach.' 0 The assumption and
rejection portions of the Code therefore permit the debtor to treat executory con-
tracts as breached as of the date of bankruptcy filing."u
105 See id. at 125 and infra note 162.
106 Second Life's Terms of Service § 3.2. http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php ("You retain
copyright and other intellectual property rights with respect to Content you create in Second Life,
to the extent that you have such rights under applicable law. However, you must make certain
representations and warranties, and provide certain license rights, forbearances and indemnifica-
tion, to Linden Lab and to other users of Second Life.") (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
107 World of Warcraft's End User License Agreement 4, http://www.worldofwarcraft.com/
legal/eula.html (last visited Sept. 13. 2009).
108 See Mission Architect Overview, http://cityoflheroes.com/game info/mission architect/
overview.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2009); City of Heroes User Agreement,
http://us.ncsoft.com/en/legal/user-agreements/city-of-heroes-user-agreement.html ("By submitting
Member Content or creating Member Content ... you ... acknowledge and agree that such Mem-
ber Content is the sole property of NC Interactive.) (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).
109 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2008) ("Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and
in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may
assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.").
110 See THOMAS M. WARD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMMERCE § 4:7, at 351 (2005) ("The
breach that results from rejection is deemed to be the debtor's prebankruptcy breach but it gives
the nonbankrupt party a claim against the estate."); 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2009) ("Except as pro-
vided in subsections (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this section, the rejection of an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract or lease ... immediately before
the date of the filing of the petition."): see also In re Penn Traffic Co., 524 F.3d 373. 378 (2d Cir.
2008) ("[R]ejection under 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) simply means that the court will permit the debtor
to breach the contract, with the result that the contractual obligations will be reduced to general
unsecured claims for prepetition damages pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1)." (citing In re Child
World, Inc., 147 B.R. 847, 852 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)))..
III See WARD. supra note 110.
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Because intellectual property licenses are often the core of a business,
such licenses are treated differently from garden-variety executory contracts in
bankruptcy. Under certain circumstances a non-debtor licensee can force the
debtor-licensor to honor an executory intellectual property license under §
365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code. Similarly, a non-debtor intellectual property
licensor may prohibit the assumption and assignment of the debtor-licensee's
rights under § 365(c).
Businesses that operate within a virtual world or users with valuable ac-
counts or digital assets may wish to use these provisions to attempt to retain
their intellectual property or, in rare cases, retain their accounts and items. The
following sub-parts explore these possibilities.
a. Section 365 and Executory Contracts
Section 365 applies only to executory contracts and unexpired leases.
The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term "executory." Most courts have
adopted Professor Countryman's well-known definition, which defines a con-
tract as executory if it is a:
[C]ontract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and
the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the
failure of either to complete performance would constitute a
material breach excusing the performance of the other. 112
The first problem facing a user or creator of virtual worlds seeking to enforce
intellectual property licenses is that such contracts are usually quite limited in
scope. Players of virtual worlds pay on a month-to-month or semi-annual basis,
and the license agreements can be terminated by either player or virtual world
creator at will. 113 Such contracts are executory because there is an obligation on
the part of both the user and the god not to sue one another for infringement of
any IP licenses they may hold." 4 But this legal distinction may not matter. In
practice, "a contract may not be assumed under Section 365 if it has already
112 Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part 1, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460
(1973).
113 See World of Warcraft's End User License Agreement, supra note 107, at 7 ("This Li-
cense Agreement is effective until terminated. You may terminate the License Agreement at any
time by (i) permanently destroying all copies of the Game in your possession or control (ii) re-
moving the Game Client from your hard drive: and (iii) notifying Blizzard of your intention to
terminate this License Agreement. Blizzard may terminate this Agreement at any time for any
reason or no reason. Upon termination for any reason, all licenses granted herein shall immediate-
ly terminate and you must immediately and permanently destroy all copies of the Game in your
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expired according to its terms."' 15 If a contract is terminated pre-petition, there
is nothing left to assume.1 16 And "executoriness is determined as of the petition
date."''" Therefore, if such a player/creator license is legitimately cancelled
prior to bankruptcy, there is no license to assume or reject. I" As a result, run-
of-the-mill player licenses are unlikely to reach even the first stages of § 365
analysis, since a bankrupt virtual world creator that wishes to turn off the world,
or sell it, will cancel all player licenses prior to the filing date.
However, there are several sorts of interests commonly found in virtual
worlds that may invoke § 365 analysis. First, virtual world creators reserve for
themselves robust licenses in user-generated content. For example, NCsoft's
City of Heroes game permits players to design missions, incorporate stories, and
add other user-generated content to the game.11 9 In its End User License
Agreement (EULA), NCsoft not only claims sole ownership of all user-
generated content, but further provides that if it is prevented by operation of law
from claiming exclusive ownership:
[Y]ou hereby grant (or you warrant that the owner of such
Member Content has expressly granted) to NC Interactive and
its related Game Content Providers a non-exclusive, universal,
perpetual, irrevocable, royalty-free, sublicenseable right to ex-
ercise all rights of any kind or nature associated with such
Member Content, and all ancillary and subsidiary rights thereto,
in any languages and media now known or not currently
known. 1
20
Such a permanent license is likely to survive into bankruptcy and to be deter-
mined executory for purposes for triggering § 365 analysis.
Similarly, some virtual worlds grant "founders' licenses" or similar life-
time licenses, in which the player pays a one-time fee in return for access to the
virtual world for as long as it remains commercially available. For example,
game developer Turbine noted: "The Lifetime Membership will afford a Found-
er ... with online access ... so long as the service provider determines, in its
115 Counties Contract & Constr. Co. v. Constitution Life Ins. Co., 855 F.2d 1054, 1061 (3d Cir.
1988).
116 2 NORTON BANKR. LAW & PRAC. § 46.18 (William L. Norton, Jr. et al eds., 3d ed. 2009)
(citing Moody v. Amoco Oil Co., 734 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984)).
117 In re Riodizio Inc., 204 B.R. 417, 421 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)
118 Counties Contract & Constr. Co., 855 F.2d at 1061.
119 Mission Architect allows players to make their own storylines for players to follow and
villains to fight. See Mission Architect Overview, supra note 108.
120 City of Heroes User Agreement, http://us.ncsoft.com/en/legal/user-agreements/city-of-
heroes-user-agreement.html (last visited Oct. 26. 2009).
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sole discretion, to make the Game commercially available."' 12 1 Now-defunct
game designer Flagship Studios, creator of Hellgate London, made a similar
offer: "Lifetime Subscription refers to the lifetime of the online subscription
component for Hellgate London, not the user's lifetime." 122 Given such lan-
guage, a virtual world creator that is reorganizing rather than liquidating may be
subject to a Founder's ability to continue its rights under § 365(n), as noted be-
low.
b. Assumption and Assignment: Exclusive and Non-
Exclusive Licenses
This subpart examines the ability of the debtor-licensee to assume or as-
sign intellectual property interests. In the virtual world context, the debtor-
licensee may either be a bankrupt virtual world that desires to assign its IP li-
censes in user-generated content to a potential buyer, or a debtor-user within a
virtual world that seeks to assume and assign rights in its account, avatar, or
other virtual assets.
123
Section 365(c) restricts the ability of the debtor-licensee to assume or
assign contracts over the non-debtor licensor's objection: 124
[T]he trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract
or unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or
lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of
duties, if ... (1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than
the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance
from or rendering performance to, an entity other than the deb-
tor .... and (B) such party does not consent to such assumption
or assignment.
125
121 Lord of the Rings Online, originally available at http://www.lotro.com/founder, now avail-
able at http://web.archive.org/web/20070305082130/www.lotro.com/founder (archived on Mar. 5,
2007) (last visited Oct. 16. 2009).
122 Hellgate: London Beta Account, originally available at
http://www.hellgatelondon.com/beta, now available at http://web.archive.org/web/
20071011194214/http://www.hellgatelondon.com/beta (archived on Oct. 11, 2007) (last visited
Oct. 16, 2009).
123 For an excellent treatment of intellectual property interests in bankruptcy, see generally,
Madlyn Gleich Primoff & Erica G. Weinberger, E-Commerce and Dot-Corn Bankruptcies: As-
sumption, Assignment and Rejection of Executory Contracts, Including Intellectual Property
Agreements, and Related Issues Under Sections 365(C), 365(E) and 365(N) of the Bankruptcy
Code, 8 AM. BANIR. INST. L. REv. 307 (2000).
124 Id. at 321; see also In re Catapult Entm't., Inc., 165 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1999) (summa-
rizing § 365(c) as barring "a debtor in possession from assuming an executory contract without
the nondebtor's consent where applicable law precludes assignment of the contract to a third
party.").
125 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (2009).
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Copyright law is "applicable law" that excuses the licensor's performance to an
assignee, since interests in copyright cannot be conveyed by parties other than
the owner.126 However, if the owner of the copyright has transferred ownership
to a third party through grant of an exclusive license, then "applicable law" will
not excuse the nondebtor-licensor from accepting performance from a third par-
ty. 27 This is based on § 101 of the Copyright Act, which states:
A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an assignment, mort-
gage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or
hypothecation of a copyright or any of the exclusive rights
comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or
place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license. 121
Thus, a debtor-licensee may unconditionally assume and assign an exclusive
copyright license, since the nondebtor-licensor has conveyed a property interest
(the exclusive license). 129 But a debtor-licensee cannot assume and assign a
non-exclusive license in a jurisdiction that follows the "hypothetical test" unless
the licensor agrees.1 30 This test bars a debtor-licensee from assuming the license
if applicable nonbankruptcy law would bar an assignment to a hypothetical third
party, whether or not assignment is actually likely to happen.
131
A minority of circuits and a majority of bankruptcy courts apply the
"actual test," which asks whether the contract interest would actually be as-
signed, or whether the intellectual property would be used solely by the debtor-
licensee. Under the actual test, a virtual world debtor-licensee could assume a
126 Primoff & Weinberger, supra note 123, at 325 n.76; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2009) (stat-
ing that the owner of a copyright under Title 17 "has the exclusive right to do and to authorize"
uses of the work); Landau v. Cosmetic & Reconstructive Surgery Ctr., Inc., 158 F.R.D. 117, 119
(N.D. I1. 1994) ("[U]nder the copyright laws, only the owner of the copyright may transfer rights
to copyrighted work.").
127 Primoff & Weinberger, supra note 123, at 326: see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2009); 17 U.S.C.
§ 201(d)(2) (2008) ("The owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled, to the extent of that
right, to all of the protection and remedies accorded to the copyright owner by this title.").
128 17 U.S.C. § 101.
129 See Primoff & Weinberger, supra note 123, at 326. See also supra notes 125-128.
130 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c).
131 The Third, Fourth. Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits all follow the plain meaning. or hypotheti-
cal test, for determining whether § 365(c) bars assumption. See 2 NORTON BANKR. LAW & PRAC. §
46.20 n.18 (citing In re Sunterra Corp.. 361 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2004) (assumption of copyright
licensing prohibited); In re Catapult Entertainment, Inc., 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999); In re James
Cable Partners, L.P., 27 F.3d 534 (11 th Cir. 1994) (assumption of contract permitted as no appli-
cable law rendered performance nondelegable); Matter of West Electronics Inc., 852 F.2d 79 (3d
Cir. 1988) (assumption of contract prohibited since contract in question could not be assigned
under applicable non-bankruptcy law without consent)).
132 The First Circuit, and many lower courts, abide by the so-called "actual test" that allows
assumption if no transfer is going to take place. See 2 NORTON BANKR. LAW & PRAC. § 46.20 n.22
(citing Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir. 1997); Texaco Inc. v.
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non-exclusive license if the court found that the licensee would not actually
assign the interest to a third party.
1 33
c. Enforcement of Intellectual Property Licenses under §
365(n)
The prior sub-part examined the risk that a debtor-licensee would not be
able to continue to use intellectual property that was licensed to it by a nonban-
krupt entity. This sub-part examines the opposite scenario to determine whether
nonbankrupt licensees can enforce their rights under license contracts rejected
by bankrupt licensors. One possible scenario would concern the bankruptcy of a
virtual world in which users had built up value in their avatars, virtual objects,
or accounts. 34 In such a case, players might elect to enforce their rights under §
365(n) against a bankrupt virtual world provider.
1 35
Section 365(n) notes:
If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the deb-
tor is a licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee
may elect--
(A) [to terminate the contract]; or
(B) to retain its rights ... under such contract ... as such rights
existed immediately before the case commenced, for []
(i) the duration of the contract; and
(ii) any period for which such contract may be extended by
the licensee as of right under applicable nonbankruptcy
law. 136
If the nondebtor licensee elects to enforce her rights in the rejected IP license,
the trustee must make the IP covered by the license available to the nondebtor
LA Land & Exploration Co.. 136 B.R. 658, 668 71 (M.D. La. 1992); In re Aerobox Composite
Structures, LLC, 373 B.R. 135 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2007); Matter of GP Exp. Airlines. Inc.. 200 B.R.
222, 231 33 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1996); Matter of American Ship Bldg. Co.. Inc., 164 B.R. 358, 362
63 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994): In re Fastrax, Inc., 129 B.R. 274, 277 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991): In re
Hartex Enters. Inc., 117 B.R. 865, 871-73 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990)).
133 Id.
134 On May 28, 2009, for example, there were $L 5,851,223,689 in play in Linden Lab's
Second Life, with an estimated value of USD $24,266,493.58, as well as value in the goods and
items users own in-world. See Economic Statistics, http://secondlife.com/statistics/economy-
data.php (last visited Sept. 12. 2009).
135 Thanks to Ken Klee for this idea and for the suggestions which sparked this section.
136 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2008).
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licensee and the nondebtor licensee must continue to pay royalties (including
license fees) for use of the IP.
This provision has been rarely discussed in the caselaw. Congress
enacted § 365(n) in response to the Fourth Circuit's decision in In re Richmond
Metal Finishers, Inc. (commonly called Lubrizol), in which a non-debtor licen-
see lost its non-exclusive license to utilize a metal coating process owned by the
debtor, Richmond Metal Finishers ("RMF").' 37 When RMF filed for Chapter 11
bankruptcy in 1983, it sought to reject the license agreement under § 365(a). 38
The bankruptcy court approved the rejection. 139 That decision was reversed by
the district court, as it found that the agreement was not executory and, alterna-
tively, that if it was, a rejection could not benefit the estate, since the license
was non-exclusive.1 40 The Fourth Circuit reversed yet again, finding that (a) the
contract was executory, as there were material duties on both sides, and (b) that
approval of a § 365 rejection gives deference to the sound business decision of
the debtor.1 4 1 The statute was unambiguous and did not contemplate the effect
of rejection on the non-debtor. The court recognized the "general chilling effect
upon the willingness of such parties to contract" under these facts, but decided
that the express language of the statute should prevail regardless. 142 Congress
responded with the enactment of § 365(n) in 1988, with the goal of permitting a
non-debtor licensee to continue use of critical intellectual property despite the
licensor's bankruptcy. Thus, the guiding principle of § 365(n) is that an IP-
licensee who has built its business model on the license may require a debtor-
licensor to continue to honor the license. 1
43
If a player's EULA is considered executory, then at first blush it may
appear that she may maintain her rights under the EULA despite the bankruptcy
and subsequent rejection of the contract by the virtual world creator. As with
rights to assume and assign, however, the executoriness of the contract may not
matter if the debtor-licensor has a unilateral contractual right to terminate the
license agreement at will-as most game gods do.1 44 If the debtor exercises her
137 Lubrizol Enterprises. Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
138 Id. at 1045.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1045-48.
142 Id. at 1048.
143 See In re CellNet Data Systems, Inc., 327 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2003) (Section 365(n) used to
require debtor-licensor to honor license regarding wireless data network for meter reading); In re
Prize Frize, Inc., 32 F.3d 426 (9th Cir. 1994) (license fees are "royalties" under the terms of the
statute, and nondebtor-licensee must continue to pay them in order to retain license); In re Ron
Matusalem & Matusa of Florida, 158 B.R. 514. 522 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) ("The court also
concludes that ... the proposed rejection would utterly destroy the business of Inc. and with it the
livelihood of Inc.'s principals and employees.").
144 See, e.g., Matter of Interco, Inc., 135 B.R. 634 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1992) (debtor could termi-
nate sale arrangement at will; thus sale arrangement was not executory); In re W.S.M. Enterprises,
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right to terminate the at-will license agreement prior to filing, the license is not
executory. 45 Post-petition, intervening circumstances (such as the election of
the debtor to exercise its contractual right to terminate an agreement) may cause
a court to deem the contract non-executory because no future obligations exist
under the contract, even though executoriness is ordinarily measured as of the
bankruptcy date. 46 The question may be academic, however, because a prevail-
ing non-debtor licensee under § 365(n) can only retain her rights for the "dura-
tion of the contract." Many players only have month-to-month licenses, and
even those who pay up in advance only secure licenses for six months to a
year.1' Thus, the vast majority of player licenses will have expired by the time
a bankruptcy reaches the assumption or rejection phase.
Inc., 102 B.R. 461 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989) ("[W]here the agreement was terminable at will, and the
termination was within the scope of the authority of the debtor-in-possession, the bankruptcy court
will not require the debtor to go through the meaningless ceremony of obtaining a confirmatory
order of court. . . . Equity will not enforce a contract specifically which, by its terms . . . the
defendant may terminate immediately [including any] contract terminable at the will of the defen-
dant. According to this analysis, the agreement in the instant case is not an executory contract.")
(citations omitted). Although a non-debtor's exercise of a terminable-at-will clause due to the
debtor's bankruptcy would violate the automatic stay and the Code's prohibition on ipso facto
clauses, see 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(A),(B),(C); In re Elder Beerman Stores Corp., 195 B.R. 1012
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996) (non-debtor's at-will termination violates automatic stay); see also In re
Ernie Haire Ford, 403 B.R. 750 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (court refused to permit enforcement of termin-
able-at-will clause), courts will generally not prevent a debtor from exercising its terminable-at-
will clauses unless some other interest (such as the preservation of employee benefits) is in play,
as noted above.
145 See NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 46:18 (3d ed. 2008) ("... Code § 365
does not refer to other types of executory contracts or leases that are terminated prior to bankrupt-
cy.").
46 See In re Spectrum Information Tech., Inc., 193 B.R. 400, 404 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996)
("The rationale of these decisions stems from the widely accepted Countryman definition that an
executory contract is one under which substantial performance remains on both sides . . . .Al-
though the agreement may have been executory on the filing date ... at the date of the Debtor's
motion to reject ...Marchione no longer had any material unperformed obligations under the
Employment Agreement."); In re Total Transp. Service, Inc., 37 B.R. 904, 906 (Bankr. W.D.
Ohio 1984) ("If the employer ceases operation of the facility, there can be no future performance
by either the employer or union members under the collective bargaining agreement of such obli-
gations .... [The] agreement before us is not executory because future performance pursuant to it
will not take place."); Gloria Manufacturing Corp. v. International Ladies Garmet Workers' Un-
ion, 734 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1984): In re Government Securities Corp, 101 Bankr. 343 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1989; In re Pesce Baking Co.. Inc.. 43 B.R. 949 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984). Other courts
will not recharacterize the contract as non-executory if the debtor accepts the benefits of post-
petition performance of a contract that was executory as of the filing date. See Penn Traffic Co.
V. COR Route 5 Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20407 *18-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (debtor's induce-
ment of post-petition performance of a contract pending assumption or rejection will not render
executory contract non-executory).
147 See, e.g., World of Warcraft Website, Subscription Options, available at: http://www.wow-




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss1/6
THE END OF THE (VIRTUAL) WORLD
Players seeking to retain their licenses during the bankruptcy of a virtual
world creator face another hurdle as well. "By rejecting the licensing agree-
ment, the debtor is relieved from performing any affirmative duties under the
contract."' 148  Section 365(n)(1)(B) states that a nondebtor licensee may retain
her rights "excluding any other right under applicable nonbankruptcy law to
specific performance of such contract. 1 49 If the nondebtor licensee elects to
retain her rights in the face of the trustee's rejection, the trustee's sole obliga-
tions are to honor any exclusivity agreements, to permit the use of the intellec-
tual property, and upon written request, allow the nondebtor licensee access to
the intellectual property, if that is covered by the contract. 50 There is no obliga-
tion that the debtor licensor perform non-license portions of the contract. "Sec-
tion 365 of the Bankruptcy Code was designed to strike an equitable balance
between protecting the interests of the non-debtor licensee with regard to con-
tinued use of the intellectual property and permitting the debtor-licensor to
avoid affirmative obligations that burden its bankruptcy estate., 151 Thus, "the
licensee cannot require specific performance of any other obligations under the
license, such as a licensor's duty to provide service, maintenance, or future up-
grades and improvements. 152
This distinction may matter a great deal in virtual worlds, because the
contract permitting access to the virtual world covers both an intellectual prop-
erty license with respect to game content, and non-iP rights with respect to
access to the virtual world's game servers. Even if a user retains her rights un-
der § 365(n) against the trustee's rejection, the virtual world provider may be
under no obligation to continue to permit the virtual world user to access the
world.
This difficulty is compounded by the twin problems of upgrades and
compatibility. As Ken Klee noted, "[t]he licensee's ability to retain a software
license may be a hollow victory if the software is rendered obsolete by postpeti-
tion upgrades to which section 365(n) protection does not extend. 1 53  Virtual
worlds are living spaces. Virtual world creators constantly provide patches and
148 Peter S. Menell, Licensor Bankruptcy, in 4-19A NINMER ON COPYRIGHT § 19A.06 (Bender
2009).
149 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B) (2008).
150 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(3) (2008) ("If the licensee elects to retain its rights, as described in
paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, then on the written request of the licensee the trustee shall -
(A) to the extent provided in such contract, or any agreement supplementary to such contract,
provide to the licensee any intellectual property (including such embodiment) held by the trustee;
and (B) not interfere with the rights of the licensee as provided in such contract, or any agreement
supplementary to such contract, to such intellectual property (including such embodiment) includ-
ing any right to obtain such intellectual property (or such embodiment) from another entity.").
151 See Primoff& Weinberger, supra note 123, at 338.
152 Id. at 342.
153 Kenneth N. Klee, Isaac M. Pachulski & David Fuller, The Effect of Bankruptcy on Intellec-
tual Property Rights. SD24 ALI-ABA 69, 74 (1998).
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updates to the original world. 5 4 Given the speed and frequency of updates, a
user of a virtual world may find herself only able to use an out-of-date version
of the software that is not compatible with the version of the world being used
by all other users. Not only are the upgrades important to improving the expe-
rience of the world, but because virtual worlds are networked, an un-upgraded
client soon becomes unable to interact with upgraded versions of the product.
Despite these limitations, § 365(n) may be useful if a virtual world pro-
vider decides to reorganize rather than liquidate. Reorganization is particularly
likely where a virtual world is merely one project in a larger company. For ex-
ample, corporate virtual world Web.Alive survived the bankruptcy of parent
company Nortel. 155 In a case where the virtual world will remain open through
bankruptcy, users might enforce licenses that the company cannot simply termi-
nate at will. Players with "founders' accounts," which remain in effect for as
long as the world remains commercially available, might be able to enforce their
licenses in bankruptcy over the rejection of the virtual world provider. 15 It re-
mains an open question, however, whether the obligation of the virtual world
provider would be simply not to impede the user-licensee's use of the intellec-
tual property, or whether it would also be required to permit the user to access
the servers that the virtual world would use from the point of bankruptcy for-
ward.
It is also possible that some non-debtor licensees will benefit from hav-
ing negotiated non-standard EULAs. Although the overwhelming majority of
virtual world users are bound by the standard EULA and Terms of Service (or
Terms of Use), powerful groups or companies that enter virtual worlds may
negotiate individualized EULAs that may have specific clauses governing the
event of bankruptcy or termination of the world service. For example, computer
giant IBM has set up a multi-million-dollar complex in Second Life, which it
uses for purposes ranging from PR to coding. 157 Such "superusers" of virtual
worlds are likely to have negotiated separate license agreements with virtual
world creators in order to protect their investments. These licenses may have
different clauses that do not permit termination of the license at will.
As noted above, another likely permutation is that a non-debtor virtual
world might use § 365(n) to maintain its rights in user-generated content created
by a debtor-user. This would require the debtor-user to itself be a significant
154 See Candidus Dougherty & Greg Lastowka, Virtual Trademarks, 24 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 749, 758 (2008) ("Often, the culture and software of a particular
virtual world are moving targets. Players establish new practices, and virtual world owners fre-
quently expand and improve their platforms by releasing downloadable 'patches' that modify the
world's space, rules and physics.").
155 See Virtual World News, Aortel Filing for Bankruptcy Protection; Web.alive Development
Uninterrupted, Jan. 14, 2009, http://www.virtualworldsnews.com/2009/01/nortel-filing-for-
bankruptcy-protection-webalive-development-uninterrupted.html.
156 See sources cited supra notes 126-130.
157 See Baker, supra note 77.
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creator of content, most likely in the form of an in-world business creating con-
tent for sale. This user-generated content creates not only business opportuni-
ties for the individual user-creators, but also is the lifeblood of some virtual
worlds. 5 ' Thus it is plausible that virtual world creators may at some point
need to maintain licenses in user-generated content. These licenses are often of
longer duration (the norm is perpetual, granted in the EULA) and may be en-
forced over the objections of the debtor-user.
Because the virtual world creator generally maintains the servers on
which the virtual world abides, there may be less difficulty in making use of the
§ 365(n) compulsory license in user-generated content. There are likely no
positive steps that the debtor-licensor would have to take to enable use of the
license. This is doubly so because the intellectual property would likely already
be instantiated on the server, and thus the virtual world creator would have a
copy available from backup, even if the debtor-licensor had deleted the content
prior to dissolution.
One catch, however, might be found in emerging industry standard
clauses governing termination of Web 2.0 operator's rights in user-generated
content. Some Web 2.0 sites, including MySpace and Facebook, responded to
consumer criticism by promising to delete their users' information once the user
herself had taken the content down. 159 Some wordings of such clauses could
certainly be construed as terminating the EULA-granted license in the user-
generated content, thus rendering the agreement non-executory, and the question
of continuation of the license moot.
B. Virtual Property
This Section considers whether virtual world creators or businesses
might be able to take out loans collateralized directly by non-IP intangible inter-
ests, such as virtual objects, currency, or real estate. While the law of intellec-
tual property in bankruptcy detailed above is relatively clear (if prolix), the law
of non-IP intangible assets is not. To return to our example of PixelDolls, the
question here is not whether PixelDolls could take out a loan based on the intel-
lectual property in her clothing designs, but instead whether her reserves of vir-
tual currency, prime virtual real estate, and other non-IP intangible assets (in-
158 Indeed, Second Life's own description is: "Second Life is an online 3D virtual world im-
agined and designed by you." See Second Life's "What is Second Life,"
http://secondlife.com/whatis/#welcome (last visited Sept. 12, 2009).
159 See Facebook's Statement of Rights and Responsibilities 2.2,
http://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Sept. 13, 2009) ("When you delete IP content, it
is deleted in a manner similar to emptying the recycle bin on a computer. However, you under-
stand that removed content may persist in backup copies for a reasonable period of time (but will
not be available to others).").
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cluding the copies of digital clothes in her store) might also serve as collateral.
In prior articles, I have termed these non-IP intangibles "virtual property. 16 °
Non-IP intangible assets are notoriously difficult to deal with under Ar-
ticle 9 and the Bankruptcy Code. 16 1 The problem lies in two distinctions that
courts often fail to make correctly. The first is the distinction between intangi-
ble and intellectual property. 62 Courts are likely to mistake intangible non-IP
interests for intellectual property interests because intangibility has long been a
163bad proxy for intellectual property. But as Juliet Moringiello importantly
noted, tangibility is utterly irrelevant to a determination of whether intellectual
or chattel property rules ought to apply.164 The proxy system ignores the many
categories of intangible assets, from domain names, to bank deposit accounts, to
stocks, to virtual property, that are not intellectual property interests at all.
1 65
The proper distinction is not difficult. I own the copy of the picture on
the wall in my office, but I do not own the copyright. The difference between
the personal property right in the copy and the intellectual property right in the
copyright is quite clear.1 66 I can take out a loan using my ownership of the copy
of the picture as collateral, without any need for me to ever own the copyright.
Note that my ownership right in the copy of the painting is every bit as intangi-
ble as the intellectual property right that inheres in the artwork.1 67 But when
160 See Virtual Property, supra note 29. The following discussion analyzes the likely treatment
of virtual property in part by reference to non-exclusive licenses in intellectual property. but that is
because this is where courts are likely to begin, not because the characterization is correct. A
right in a copy of a book is distinct from even the non-exclusive copyright license that comes with
the copy.
161 See False Categories, supra note 100. at 125 ("Article 9 of the U.C.C. was also revised
recently. but its provisions do not adequately govern security interests in intangible rights.").
162 See id. at 141 ("[C]ourts and some scholars tend to give new intangible rights the 'intellec-
tual property' label.").
163 See id. at 137 ("Despite the fact that individuals commonly think of intangible rights embo-
died in almost worthless tangible things as property, intangible rights unconnected to tangible
things continue to confound judges.").
164 See id at 120 ("[T]he category of tangible is irrelevant in property law and ... commercial
law must discard distinctions based on the physical manifestations of assets and focus instead on
the legal qualities of those assets.").
165 See id. at 147 ("An internet domain name is an example of such property.") see also Virtual
Property. supra note 29. at 1057 ("Virtual property also plays an important part in financial insti-
tutions - a bank account may be one of the earliest forms of virtual property.").
166 See Virtual Property, supra note 29. at 1096 ("We understand instinctually and logically
that ownership of a thing is always separate from ownership of the intellectual property embedded
in a thing. Ownership of a book is not ownership of the intellectual property of the novel that the
author wrote. The book purchaser owns the physical book, nothing more.... An owner of virtual
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there is no tangible object to anchor the personal property right, courts become
confused and mistake intangibility for intellectual property.
168
The second distinction that causes confusion is that between property
and contract. 169 In some areas of the law, property rights are defined in contra-
diction to contract rights (as in the treatment of executory contracts versus com-
pleted property transfers in intellectual property licenses, above). 170 And, some
commentators have argued that because Article 9 limits itself to transactions
creating a security interest in property, contract rights are necessarily excluded
from the ambit of Article 9.171 Some courts have taken this to mean that "con-
tract" rights cannot be "property" rights, and that non-IP intangible assets
created by contract, like a domain name registration, are not "property" in its
purest sense, and thus are outside of the scope of Article 9. Under this theory,
non-IP intangible assets like a domain name registration-if it is deemed a pure
contract right by state law-cannot be the subject matter of a security interest at
all. 172
Courts that follow this approach do not grasp the breadth of the revised
UCC or the Bankruptcy Code. 73 "Property" under the UCC and the Bankruptcy
Code does not stand in strict contradistinction to "contract." Both Article 9 and
the Bankruptcy Code include numerous contract rights as property in which a
debtor can create a security interest, or as property of the debtor's estate.' 74 The
168 See False Categories, supra note 100, at 147 ("This habit is a harmful one because it directs
judges and lawmakers to look to intellectual property law rather than property law generally for
rules to govern electronic assets.").
169 See id. at 135 ("When intangible assets are at issue, however, people have difficulty extri-
cating the intangible asset from the contract that conveyed the property right in that asset.").
170 See id. at 137 38 ("By failing to look beyond the fact that the assets in question were in-
tangible, the courts deciding these cases made decisions that have the potential to hinder the de-
velopment of the property law components of commercial law.").
171 See Revised U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (defining "security interest" as "an interest in personal
property... which secures payment or performance of an obligation."). The Code in fact express-
ly contemplates security interests in non-IP general intangible contract rights like non-exclusive
licenses in software, see U.C.C. § 9-408 and Official Cmts., leaving the determination of whether
the rights can support a security interest to state law. Thus, Official Comment 3 to Article 9, §
408 states that "[n]either this section nor any other provision of this Article determines whether a
debtor has a property interest. The definition of the term 'security interest' provides that it is an
'interest in personal property.' .... Other law determines whether a debtor has a property interest
... and the nature of that interest. For example. the nonexclusive [software] license addressed in
Example 1 may not create any property interest whatsoever ......
172 See, e.g., Network Solutions v. Umbro Int'l. Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80. 86 88 (Va. 2000).
17, See False Categories, supra note 100, at 122 ("[W]hen novel issues arise in transactions
covered by the U.C.C., courts should fill the statutory gaps. Courts, by focusing on the intangi-
bility of electronic assets and not on the relationships between the persons claiming rights in those
assets and the assets themselves, are not adequately filling the gaps.").
174 See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (defining "general intangible" as including "any personal proper-
ty, including things in action ... includ[ing] payment intangibles and software."); see also U.C.C.
§ 9-408 and Official Cmts., dissolving contractual and legislative restrictions on creation, attach-
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Bankruptcy Code includes all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in prop-
erty as of the commencement of the case as property of the debtor's estate, in-
cluding contracts.'75 Thus, "[c]ontractual rights are intangible property which is
included within the definition of the estate of the debtor."' 16 Current Article 9
expressly permits the creation of security interests in contract rights under the
rubric of general intangibles - taking as its core example non-exclusive li-
censes for computer software - and dissolves state laws or contractual provi-
sions that attempt to stop the creation, perfection, or attachment of security in-
terests in such intangibles. 177 Other contract rights fall into distinct categories of
permissible collateral under Article 9, including accounts, payment intangibles,
accounts receivable, and more.1 8 Indeed, under the 1962 version of Article 9,
"contract rights" had their own collateral category, now subsumed variously
under the definitions of "accounts" and "general intangibles."'' 79 Thus, an asset
is not excluded from being deemed "property" for purposes of Article 9 merely
because it is a contract right.1 80 If that were so, Article 9's "property" require-
ment would be irreconcilable with its many express provisions dealing with the
creation of security interests in different forms of pure contract rights.
These two basic errors can lead to a serious discrepancy between brick-
and-mortar businesses and their virtual counterparts. If a court mistakes non-IP
intangible assets for intellectual property interests, it is not likely to enforce a
ment, or perfection of security interests in general intangibles, including non-exclusive licenses of
software.: see also U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (defining "account").
175 Thus, for example. the debtor's executory contracts become part of the debtor's bankruptcy
estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2009) (defining "property of the estate" to include "all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."): see also Mi-
chelle Morgan Harner et al.. Debtors Beware: The Expanding Universe of Non-Assumable/Non-
Assignable Contracts in Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 187, 244 & n.232 ("A debtor's
interest in an unassumed executory contract ... generally is considered property of the debtor's
estate under section 541(a)."( citing Cinicola v. Sharffenberger. 248 F.3d 110, 121 (3d Cir. 2001)
(same); In re Rickel Home Ctrs., Inc., 209 F.3d 291, 302 n.12 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); and Com-
puter Communications. Inc. v. Codex Corp. (In re Computer Communications. Inc.), 824 F.2d
725. 730 (9th Cir. 1987) (same))).
176 In re Chateauguay Corp., 116 B.R. 887, 898 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
177 See U.C.C. § 9-408 and Official Cmts. (2009).
178 See Juliet M. Moringiello. Seizing Domain Names to Enforce Judgments: Looking Back to
Look to the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 108 (2003) ("Today, no one would argue that a deposit
account held by a bank is not the property of the depositor.... Uncertificated securities provide
another example. It is impossible for a stockholder to take physical possession of an uncertifi-
cated security.").
179 See Kenneth Kettering. True Sale of Receivables: A Purposive Analysis, 16 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 511. 513 n.6 (2008) ("Article 9 originally governed 'any sale of accounts, contracts
rights, or chattel paper."' U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(b) (1962). The 1972 revision deleted the concept of
"contract rights" from Article 9, its content being picked up by the definitions of "account" and
"general intangible.").
180 See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 14, Lawbook Ex-
change (1999) ("It is ... generally agreed that insurance policies are pledgeable.").
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security agreement because the debtor may not own intellectual property in
which a security interest can be created.18 1  On the other hand, if the court ar-
gues that the assets are non-exclusive software licenses, and that they cannot be
the subject of a security interest because "contracts" cannot be "property," the
182same result is achieved l. The parties again cannot use valuable collateral to
reduce the cost of capital. This would be like barring me from using my picture
as collateral because I do not own the copyright, or because I possess a non-
exclusive license in the intellectual property that inheres in the picture. Even if
both are true, these facts should not impede me from using the picture itself as
collateral. 183
If courts fail to grasp these distinctions, PixelDolls (from the example
above) would not be permitted to mortgage its virtual real estate, because Lin-
den Lab (the creator of Second Life) owns intellectual property that inheres in
that virtual land, and merely licenses it to PixelDolls. 1 4 Under this sort of anal-
ysis, there will continue to be a serious disconnect under both bankruptcy and
secured transactions law. Consider a music store owner who operates on a regu-
lar streetcorner. Her inventory of CDs can serve as collateral for a loan, despite
the fact that she does not own any IP interest in them. Now consider a music
store owner on a corner in a virtual world. Her inventory of MP3s of the very
same music would not be valid collateral if a court mistook the right to a copy
for the copyright, or if the court barred the creation of security interests in the
collateral because it involved contract rights.
But once these two theoretical hurdles are overcome, there should be no
bar to creating a security interest in non-IP virtual property."5 The best fit with
U.C.C. Article 9 for such a right would still be as a "general intangible," the
U.C.C.'s catch-all category.1 6 A virtual world business ought to be able to draft
181 See Unbro, 529 S.E.2d at 86-88 (characterizing domain name as contract right rather than
property right, and thus not subject to garnishment); See also False Categories, supra note 100, at
149 ("Had the court characterized the domain name as property, lawyers relying on the decision
could then find some way to take possession or control of it. By characterizing it as intellectual
property. however, the court directed lawyers to consult the far more complex rules regarding
enforcement of judgments in intellectual property rights. As a result, the Virginia Supreme Court
pointed out in Umbro that intellectual property rights generally cannot be taken by creditors using
procedures such as execution or seizure.").
182 See, e.g.. Bank of Am. Strategic Solutions, Inc., v. Cooker Rest. Corp., 2006 Ohio 4567
(Ohio App. 2006) (holding that liquor license was a personal license, and thus could not be the
subject of a security interest, despite language of § 9-408 holding invalid state laws barring crea-
tion of security interest in contract rights).
183 See False Categories. supra note 100, at 150 ("Thus. the treatment of domain names as
intellectual property can lead to a wrong result.").
184 Cf id at 150 ("Therefore, while Article 9 of the U.C.C. defines collateral in property terms,
any right that a debtor can exchange for money should be considered a property right for commer-
cial law purposes.").
185 See id. at 165 ("In commercial law ... adaptation is necessary, because it would be sense-
less to revise the Uniform Commercial Code every time a novel form of asset is developed.").
186 See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (defining "general intangible").
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carefully a security agreement that would detail the non-IP assets to be used as
collateral under the designation of "general intangibles," authorize the filing of a
financing statement covering such general intangibles, and reasonably expect
that the interest would be enforced in bankruptcy. 187
Although a carefully-drafted security agreement and a financing state-
ment covering general intangibles ought to work, there are two weaknesses to a
general intangibles approach that lead me to offer alternative solutions below.
The first is that virtual property would still share the "general intangibles" cate-
gory with intellectual property, which would continue to foster the kind of con-
fusion detailed above. Although a detailed security agreement could clarify
between the parties that only the non-iP components are collateral, a designation
of "general intangibles" on the financing statement might leave the impression
that all of the intellectual property of a company is encumbered, when in fact
only its non-iP intangibles are collateral.
The second problem is that, just as security interests in bank deposit ac-
counts require the consent of the depository bank, or security interests in in-
vestment accounts require the consent of the brokerage, a security interest in
virtual world assets ought to involve the participation of the game god. UCC
Article 9-408 dissolves contract clauses that prohibit the creation, attachment, or
perfection of a security interest in numerous types of intangibles (including non-
exclusive software licenses), but such a security interest cannot be enforced
against the software licensor, or, indeed, against the debtor.1 88 Thus, a non-
assignment clause in a virtual world EULA could not prevent a user/debtor from
creating, or a secured party from perfecting, a security interest in the user's
rights under the contract. 189 However, the secured party could not enforce the
debtor's rights under the nonexclusive software license against the game god,
nor could it foreclose on the license. 90 This non-enforceable security interest in
187 See U.C.C. § 9-310 (permitting perfection of security interest for all interests not otherwise
specified by means of a filed financing statement).
188 See U.C.C. § 9-408(a)(1),(c)(1), (d) (holding ineffective contractual and legislative provi-
sions barring creation, attachment, or perfection of security interests in general intangibles, but
denying the secured party any enforcement power or right to the debtor's rights in the general
intangible).
189 See U.C.C. § 9-408(a)(1), (c)(1), and Official Cmt. 2 ("This section makes ineffective any
attempt to restrict the assignment of a general intangible ... whether the restriction appears in the
.. agreement between an account debtor and a debtor ... or in a rule of law, including a statute
or governmental rule or regulation .... This result allows the creation, attachment, and perfection
of a security interest in a general intangible, such as an agreement for the nonexclusive license of
software .... ).
190 See U.C.C. § 9-408(d)(1) (4) and Official Cmt. 2 ("On the other hand, subsection (d) pro-
tects the other party the "account debtor" on a general intangible ... from adverse effects aris-
ing from the security interest. It leaves the account debtor's or obligated person's rights and obli-
gations unaffected in all material respects .... Example 1: A term of an agreement for the non-
exclusive license of computer software prohibits the licensee from assigning any of its rights as
licensee with respect to the software .... The licensee, as debtor, grants to a secured party a secu-
rity interest in its rights under the license and in the computers in which it is installed. Under this
[Vol. 112
34
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss1/6
THE END OF THE (VIRTUAL) WORLD
general intangibles is nevertheless useful because it preserves the secured par-
ty's perfection and priority in proceeds of the general intangible if it is ever sold
with permission of the software licensor.19 1 Thus, in a bankruptcy proceeding,
the secured party would be protected.1
92
Yet the one thing missing from § 9-408's regime is self-help enforce-
ment. Self-help enforcement of intangibles usually involves going to the gate-
keeper of the intangible to transfer the asset. For example, foreclosing on a
bank deposit account means that the secured party requests the depository bank
to transfer funds out of the account. Similarly, investment account foreclosure
means telling the brokerage to sell the stocks. Thus, as detailed at greater length
in the solutions section, below, a better model for security interests in virtual
property would include the game god, so that the secured party could foreclose
on the virtual assets without need for judicial proceedings.
C. ToySmart and Customer Lists
There is a third type of virtual world asset that is both of enormous val-
ue and likely to be subject to particularized rules in bankruptcy. As with tradi-
tional dot-coms, information about the customers of a bankrupt entity is the item
most likely to excite interest from other virtual world providers.1 93 Thus, this
section examines the process by which a virtual world may sell the vast store of
information it gathers about its customers.
Virtual world creators gather enormous amounts of information about
their customers both overtly and tacitly. 194 Some of this is traditional personally
identifiable information: credit card numbers, names, real-space and email ad-
section, the term ... is ineffective .... However, under subsection (d), the secured party ... is
not entitled to enforce the license or to use, assign, or otherwise enjoy the benefits of the licensed
software .... ).
191 See U.C.C. § 9-408, Official Cmt. 7 ("This section could have a substantial effect if the
assignor enters bankruptcy. Roughly speaking, Bankruptcy Code Section 552 invalidates security
interests in property acquired after a bankruptcy petition is filed, except to the extent that the
postpetition property constitutes proceeds of prepetition collateral. Example 4: A debtor is the
owner of a cable television franchise that, under applicable law, cannot be assigned without the
consent of the municipal franchisor. [The debtor grants a security interest in the franchise, as well
as all other existing and after acquired property, to secure a loan, over the municipality's objec-
tion.] Under this section .. .the security interest would attach to the franchise. As a result, the
security interest would attach to the proceeds of any sale of the franchise while a bankruptcy is
pending.").
192 See id.
193 See, e.g., Order Approving Motion for Order Authorizing Sale and Assignment of Property
of the Estate Free and Clear of Liens and Claims, and Approving Bidding Protection, In re Identi-
ty Play. Inc.. No. 2-08-bk-19025 ER (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 5. 2009) (selling faketown.com and
other URLs, trademarks, trade names, source code, graphics. goodwill. and customer user data-
base for $20,000 the largest asset of the bankrupt entity).
194 See Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Escape into the Panopticon: Virtual Worlds and the Surveillance
Society. 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 131 (2009).
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dresses, birth dates (for purposes of screening children out of mature content),
and telephone numbers for customer service purposes. 195 Virtual world provid-
ers also gather and maintain logs of interactions and conversations within their
worlds. 196 Some maintain these logs for a very short time; others seem to have
kept logs for years.1 97 For example, Linden Labs logs every commercial trans-
action within its virtual world,1 98 and in the Bragg199 case, it was able to produce
records of conversations between players in virtual worlds that occurred years
prior to litigation. 200 Thus, virtual world providers gather not only their custom-
ers' credit card numbers, but information about their actions, speech, intimate
behavior, purchasing patterns, and places visited throughout the virtual world.
The depth and completeness of the potential customer profiles make standard
clickstream data gathering seem passe. All of this information is potentially up
for sale in a bankruptcy.
1. ToySmart
In 2000, following a poor holiday season of sales, online vendor ToyS-
mart announced that it was going out of business, and advertised in the Wall
195 See, e.g., Second Life Privacy Policy, http://www.secondlife.com/corporate/privacy.php
(last visited Sept. 15, 2009) ("As used in this privacy policy, the term 'personal information'
means any information that may be used to identify an individual, including, but not limited to. a
first and last name, home or other physical address, and email address, phone number or other
contact information, whether at work or at home .... We collect personal information and usage
statistics to maintain a high-quality customer experience and deliver superior customer service.").
See also Blizzard Entertainment Online Privacy Policy. http://www.blizzard.com/us/privacy.html;
(last visited Sept. 15, 2009); Disney's Club Penguin's Privacy Policy,
http://www.clubpenguin.com/privacy.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2009).
196 See George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?.
13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, 10 n.34 (2007) ("Voluminous logs of chat are kept by administrators of
the game to resolve disputes and to police the virtual world for adherence to rules.").
197 Most privacy policies do not include a time limit for retaining the data they collect. Linden
Lab produced logs from years before in response to a lawsuit brought against them. Infra note
200.
198 See Second Life's Terms of Service, supra note 106. at § 6.2 (allowing for recordation of all
interactions, including in-game trades without monetary exchange).
199 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
200 See BENJAM[N TYSON DURANSKE, VIRTuAL LAW, 45 56 (2008) (noting Linden Lab's ability
to produce records of conversations years after the fact): see also Defendants Linden Research,
Inc. & Philip Rosedale's Answer to Complaint & Linden Research, Inc.'s First Amended Counter-
claims Against Plaintiff Marc Bragg for: (1) Federal Computer Fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1030; (2) Cali-
fornia Statutory Computer Fraud, Cal. Penal Code § 502; (3) Breach of Contract; (4) Breach of the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (5) California Statutory Unfair Competition,
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200; (6) Declaratory Judgment 32-64, Bragg v. Linden Research,
Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007), available at 2007 WL 2435763 (describing Bragg's
bidding and conversations with other users leading up to Linden Lab's suspension of his account).
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Street Journal for offers to purchase its customer lists. 20 1 ToySmart was forced
into involuntary bankruptcy the next day.20 2 The FTC opposed the sale of the
customer list, because ToySmart's privacy policy stated that personally identifi-
203able information would not be shared with third parties. Eventually, the FTC
and ToySmart reached an agreement, but when that deal was introduced in the
bankruptcy proceedings, it was challenged by 47 state attorneys general, com-
plaining that the settlement compromised consumer rights to satisfy creditors.0 4
The bankruptcy court did not rule on whether the sale violated Section 5 of the
FTC Act, as alleged by the FTC, but instead awaited a buyer.20 5 The customer
service list was eventually sold to parent company Disney for $50,000 on the
condition that it be destroyed.2 °6
2. Section 363(b)(1)
The ToySmart controversy generated significant comment and criti-
cism. Congress responded by amending the Bankrupcty Code with sections
363(b)(1), 101(41A), and 332, to deal with situations in which a sale of perso-
nally identifiable information in bankruptcy might violate the debtor's privacy
policy. 2° 7 Section 363(b)(1) limits the power of the trustee to sell personally
identifiable information about customers if the debtor's privacy policy prohibits
such a transfer, and if such a policy is in effect as of the date of the commence-
ment of the case.20 8 Personally identifiable information ("P11") is defined in 11
U.S.C. § 101(41A)(A) as including names, geographical addresses, electronic
addresses (including email), telephone numbers, or credit card numbers. P11
also includes in Section 41A(B) "any other information concerning an individu-
201 See Richard A. Beckmann, Comment, Privacy Policies and Empty Promises: Closing the
"Toysmart Loophole," 62 U. PITT. L. REv. 765, 767 (2001) (citing Victoria Colliver, Dot-corn
Closures Distressing Consumers-Unfulfilled Orders, Lost Sensitive Data Vexing E-shoppers, S.F.
EXAMINER, July 7, 2000, at D1).
202 See Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, F.T.C. v. Toysmart.com, 2000 WL 34016434 (D.
Mass. 2000), 2000 WL 34016406 (July 21, 2000), 12 available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/7/toysmartcomplaint.htm.
203 See Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, supra note 202. at 17 18; Beckmann, supra
note 201.
204 See Beckmann. supra note 201, at 768 (citing Objection of the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts and 46 States to the Debtor's Motion to Approve Settlement With Federal Trade Com-
mission and for Authority to Enter Into Consent agreement, In re Toysmart.com. L.L.C.. No. 00-
13995-CJK (Bankr. E.D. Mass Aug. 10, 2000)).
205 See Order Denying Motion to Approve Stipulation. In re Toysmart.com, L.L.C., No. 00-
13995-CJK (Bankr. E.D. Mass Aug. 17, 2000): Beckmann supra note 201. at 769.
206 See Victoria Shannon, Tech Brief- ToySmart Paid Off N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/11 /business/worldbusiness/ I liht-techbrief.2.t 67.html.
207 See Kenneth N. Klee & Brendt C. Butler, The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 Business Bankruptcy Amendments, 38 UCC L.J. 4 Art. 1 (2006).
208 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2008).
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al that, if disclosed, will result in contacting or identifying such individual phys-
ically or electronically" if that information is paired with any of the information
listed in Section 41 A(A).209
For virtual world providers, this latter language is quite encompassing.
Every action and word in a virtual world is traceable to the account of the per-
son making the statement. Virtual world accounts are tied to a real world name,
email address, and credit card number. Moreover, an avatar name - like an
email address - is an electronic pseudonym that enables a party to contact the
individual electronically. Thus, almost all of the information gathered by virtual
world providers on their consumers consists of information that could lead to
"contacting or identifying such individual physically or electronically," and it is
all paired with information listed in Section 41(A)(A).
Based on this broad statutory ambit, the consumer protection offered by
363(b)(1) may appear to significantly hinder the sale of personally identifiable
information by a bankrupt virtual world provider. Not so. The statute does not
apply at all if the privacy policy of the virtual world provider expressly permits
the transfer of P11 in the event of bankruptcy. 210 Such clauses are quotidian in
virtual world EULAs. 211 Thus the effect of the statute is limited entirely to cases
in which the sale of the personally identifiable information is not "consistent
with [the virtual world provider's] policy.
2 12
Section 363(b)(1) therefore creates a mechanism for legitimating sales
under privacy policies that do not expressly permit transfer of personally identi-
fiable information. This whitewashing effect occurs through an "ombudsman,"
213appointed under § 332 of the Act. The role of the ombudsman is to "provide
to the court information to assist the court" in considering the impact of the data
sale on consumer privacy expectations. 14 The statute suggests that the om-
budsman (and thus the judge) consider the text of the privacy policy, the effects
of the sale on consumer privacy, the costs or benefits to consumers of the sale,
and potential alternatives or conditions to the sale. 15 In practice, the recom-
mendations of the ombudsman tend toward three primary suggestions - that
the sale be to a "qualified buyer" who is in the industry of the debtor; that the
209 11 U.S.C. § 101(41A)(B) (2008).
210 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2008) ("[T]he trustee may not sell or lease personally identifiable
information to any person unless - (A) such sale or such lease is consistent with such poli-
cy .... ").
211 See e.g. Second Life's Privacy Policy. supra note 195 ("In addition, if Linden Lab should
ever file for bankruptcy or merge with another company. we may sell the information you provide
to us on this site to a third party or share your personal information with any company with whom
we merge.").
212 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1).
213 See Luis Salazar, Don't Fear the Consumer Privacy Ombudsman, 26-Jan AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 42 (2008).
214 11 U.S.C. § 332 (2008).
215 11 U.S.C. § 332(b)(1) (4) (2008).
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buyer will serve as successor-in-interest to the debtor's security and privacy
policies; and that the customers be provided an opportunity to opt in or (more
commonly) opt out of the proposed transfer. 16
In practice, courts have used the appointment and hearing provision to
help clarify ambiguities in privacy policies that do not expressly consider trans-
fer in the event of bankruptcy.217 Such a hearing is not required by the statute,
because such a transfer is consistent with a privacy policy that is silent on the
subject.2 1 Nevertheless, courts have used the information gathering abilities of
the ombudsman to lend an aura of legitimacy to such transfers.219
One constraint appears in § 363(b)(1)(B)(ii). This section notes that ap-
proval for a sale inconsistent with a privacy policy must nevertheless satisfy
applicable nonbankruptcy law. 220 Although some question remains as to what
law applies, at minimum courts should consider whether the transfer violates
FTC Act Section 5(a)'s prohibition on "unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 22'
Other possible sources of applicable nonbankruptcy law may include COPPA
222
(for children's virtual worlds), HIPAA 223 (for medical sites), FCRA224 (for on-
line businesses dealing with financial data), or the EU Privacy Directive 225 (for
those virtual worlds with substantial numbers of players from the European Un-
ion).
216 See Salazar, supra note 213, at 42.
217 See id. ("In general, these ombudsmen encountered similar sets of facts - debtors seeking
to sell P11 in the face of privacy policies that did not explicitly allow or were silent as to such
transfers.").
218 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(A) (2008).
219 Luis Salazar accumulated a list of 10 cases that have applied the ombudsman provision; in
two of them, he served as the ombudsman. See Salazar, supra note 213, at 42 (citing In re Refco
Inc., et al., Case No. 05-60006 (RDD) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Storehouse Inc.. Case No.
06-11144 (SSM) (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007): In re Tweeter Home Entertainment Group Inc. et al.,
Case No. 07-10787 (PJW) (Bankr. D. Del. 2007): In re R.J. Gators Inc., et al., Case No. 07-14954
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007): In re Foxtons Inc., Case No. 07-24496 (Bankr. D. N.J. 2007): JS Market-
ing and Communications Inc., Case No. 05-65426-11 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2007); In re Engaging and
Empowering Citizenship Inc., Case No. 02-BKC-28175-CGC (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2006); In re Three
A's Holdings LLC, et al., Case No. 06-10886 (BLS) (Bankr. D. Del. 2006); In re Bodies in Mo-
tion Inc., Case No. 06-10931 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006), and In re Western Medical Inc., Case. No.
06-01784 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2006)).
220 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2008).
221 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2008).
222 The Children's Online Privacy Act of 1998 (COPPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501 et seq. (2008);
Title XIII, Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act. 1999.
223 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 15 U.S.C. §§
6801 et seq. (2008).
224 The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2008).
225 The European Union Privacy Directive of 1995, Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L. 281)
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IV. CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
One significant difficulty with securing loans with virtual property is
the ongoing failure of the law to honor legal interests in digital assets distinct
from any intellectual property interest. This problem surfaces repeatedly in the
cases and issues discussed above. Secured lenders have difficulty enforcing a
security interest in a URL or domain name, because courts consider the domain
226name a contract right rather than a right in property. Yet bankruptcy courts
sell off domain names as personal property - and often the most valuable asset
of a bankrupt dot-corn's estate - all the time.22 7 Similarly, Article 9 has clari-
fied the process by which a software vendor can borrow money against software
inventory.228 But the clarification in the law came just in time for business
models to change - what chattel property interest in inventory can a direct-to-
download vendor use to finance its business?
229
The confusion is compounded by discussions of exclusive and non-
exclusive licenses of intellectual property. An exclusive license in intellectual
property is indeed a property interest, and the conveyance of such a license is a
sale.230 But an exclusive license is the sale of an ownership interest in the right
to make copies, not of the right to any given copy. 23 1 Thus, it is possible to con-
vey a number of interests inherent in virtual property, each distinct. It is possi-
ble to sell a right to make copies exclusively (construed as a property interest).
226 See Dorer v. Arel, 60 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D. Va. 1999); Zurakov v. Register.com, Inc., 304
A.D.2d 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro International, Inc., 529
S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000). But see Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003): Harrods, Ltd. v.
Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214 (4th Cir. 2002): Caesars World, Inc. v. Caesars-
Palace.Com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502 (E.D. Va. 2000): In re Larry Koenig & Assoc., No. 01-12829
2004 WL 3244582 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2004) (slip opinion).
227 See, e.g., In re Identity Play, Inc., supra note 13.
228 See U.C.C. § 9-102(42) ("General intangible" definition includes software); U.C.C. § 9-3 10
(general rule is perfection by filing.)
229 See, e.g., Direct2Drive, www.direct2drive.com (software vendor selling solely electronic
copies of software).
230 See The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("A 'transfer of copyright ownership' is an assign-
ment, mortgage, exclusive license, or of any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a
copyright or any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in
time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.").
231 See id. at § 106 ("Subject to sections 107 through 122. the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the
copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4) in the case of literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovi-
sual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, dramat-
ic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including
the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly: and (6) in the case of sound recordings. to perform the copyrighted work publicly
by means of a digital audio transmission.") (emphasis added).
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It is possible to license the IP non-exclusively (construed as a contract interest).
And, it should be possible to convey a property interest in a copy, as distinct
from the sale or licensing of the copyrights. (For that matter, it is also possible
to rent out the chattel right in the copy, as in a video rental store.)
These distinct interests work well together when there is a physical ob-
ject in which intellectual property inheres. But confusion strikes when intellec-
tual property inheres in a digital object. As a matter of theory, there is no diffi-
culty distinguishing between a chattel property right in a copy of a thing and the
right to make copies of a thing. Rights in a copy have long been distinguished
from copyrights. Only online have courts and lawyers become confused about
this distinction.
Law has moved haltingly to resolve these issues. There has been some
progress in treating digital objects as things. URLs, despite their occasional
treatment as contract rights in enforcement actions, are governed by the Anti-
Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, which has an explicit in rem action
against the digital object itself if the defendant registrant of the URL is not as-
certainable after reasonable effort. 32 Revised Article 9 has also taken several
steps to reify certain types of intangibles, especially those that (like most forms
of virtual property) consist of valuable rights in a resource that are actually just
entries in an electronic database. 33
For example, Article 9 has adopted the "control" mechanic from Article
8 as its means of granting a security interest in certain intangible assets, like
bank accounts, investment accounts, or electronic chattel paper. 34 Under Ar-
ticle 9, one means of creating a security interest is to physically pledge the item
of property. 235 The transfer of possession from debtor to lender provides notice
to subsequent lenders that the asset is encumbered.2 36 Control is Article 9's
proxy for possession, where the asset cannot be traditionally possessed due to its
232 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(a) (2006) ("The owner of a mark may file an in rem civil action
against a domain name in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar. domain name
registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the domain name is lo-
cated .... ).
233 See supra notes 88 90.
234 See Steven Walt, Underestimation Bias and the Regulation of Consumer Debt, 40 UCC L.J.
2 Art. 3 (2007) ("Displacement matters for intangible collateral because Article 9 eliminates the
exclusive control requirement for collateral regulated by it. Deposit accounts represent a valuable
type of intangible right, and Article 9 does not regulate security interests in consumer deposit
accounts as original collateral. Thus the common law of pledge and assignment. including the
exclusive control rule, continues to apply to them. The increased costs of collateralizing the con-
sumer's deposit account arguably induces the debtor to gauge the true risk of default on a prospec-
tive secured loan."). Compare U.C.C. § 8-106 (2002), with U.C.C. §§ 9-104-105 (2002), U.C.C.
§ 9-106 (2002) ("A person has control of a certificated security, uncertificated security, or security
entitlement as provided in Section 8-106."), and U.C.C. § 9-107 (2002).
235 Walt, supra note 234, at Art. 3.
236 See U.C.C. § 9-314(a) (2002) ("A security interest in investment property, deposit accounts,
letter-of-credit rights, or electronic chattel paper may be perfected by control of the collateral
under Section 9-104, 9-105. 9-106. or 9-107.").
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intangible nature. A party has control of an asset when she has secured the
permission of the maintaining intermediary entity (a bank in the case of a bank
account, or the investment firm in the case of an investment account, etc.) to
honor the to-be-secured party's orders with respect to the collateral 7.23  For ex-
ample, a secured party has control of an investment account if the maintaining
intermediary agrees to honor the request by the secured party to have the in-
vestments sold.
This system of control governs assets that are much like digital assets or
currency. For example, a bank account is much like virtual property. First, the
actual nature of the account is merely an entry in a database. Similarly, many
virtual assets consist merely in an annotation in an electronic database that a
player "owns" a given piece of land or asset. Ownership online consists in per-
missions; the registry of permissions, similar to a registry of land ownership, is
the core of the system of ownership of such assets.
A second important similarity between virtual assets and bank accounts
are that each is subject to the important and potentially overriding interests of
the entity that maintains the asset.23  Because any security interest in a bank
account must involve the bank that maintains the account, the bank must be
involved in any "control" agreement that creates a security interest in the ac-
count in favor of a third party.239 In the same way, any agreement that would
permit self-help with respect to assets within a virtual world would almost nec-
essarily involve a three-way agreement between debtor, creditor, and the virtual
world creator. Thus, the model of "control" drawn from and expanded by the
revisions to Article 9 might be a good place to begin in determining an effective
mechanic for perfection of interests in digital objects. This is the mechanic al-
ready used by Article 9 to govern security interests in electronic chattel paper, a
form of legal right that has been traditionally "tangified" by trading the instan-
tiation in the paper as a marker for trading the legal right.240
This article has proposed a theoretical overhaul of how courts value and
understand digital assets in the bankruptcy context. Virtual objects and curren-
cy are indisputably worth real dollars. As such, courts should strive to form
common-sense notions of what these assets are and are worth, such that online
237 See U.C.C. § 9-206.
238 See U.C.C. §§ 9-104, 9-314, 9-327(3) (bank deposit account is perfected by control agree-
ment between debtor, secured party. and depository bank; however, depository bank's interest in
amounts on deposit will trump the secured lender's interest unless the parties conclude an explicit
subordination agreement).
239 See U.C.C. §§ 9-314 (general rule of perfection by control in specified intangible assets), 9-
104 (control of deposit account). 9-106 and 8-106 (control of investment property. including se-
curities or securities accounts). 9-107 (control of letter-of-credit rights).
240 See U.C.C. § 9-105 ("A secured party has control of electronic chattel paper if the record or
records comprising the chattel paper are created, stored, and assigned in such a manner that: (1) a
single authoritative copy of the record or records exists which is unique, identifiable and ... unal-
terable . . . -(2) the authoritative copy identifies the secured party as the assignee of the record ...
[and other conditions apply limiting copies of the authoritative copy].").
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businesses can take out the same loans against inventory that their brick-and-
mortar compatriots can. Further, courts should realize that despite the novel
nature of online intangible assets, law has already done much of the work of
recognizing the value of certain kinds of intangibles, and these areas of law can
serve as models. Lessons can be drawn from the independent film financing
context for intellectual property assets. For digital inventory, courts might draw
from Article 9's treatment of software. And for player accounts and digital ob-
jects, courts might draw on Article 9's treatment of bank accounts and reified
legal rights like chattel paper.
V. CONCLUSION
The recent spate of high-profile virtual world shutdowns could easily be
taken as a sign that this technology has passed its zenith. Not so. The broader
picture is that the virtual worlds industry - like the rest of the games industry
- is maturing. Companies with track records or teams with established reputa-
tions may wish to move from traditional venture capital financing, often used
most by new firms, to more traditional secured lending, the hallmark of an es-
tablished industry.
The virtual worlds industry is in many ways ideally positioned to capi-
talize on new and innovative funding opportunities. Virtual assets are worth
enormous amounts of real money. However, the uncertainty surrounding digital
assets in bankruptcy is a significant hurdle. This article has suggested that much
clarity can be gained by treating digital assets as personal property, subject to
security interests by filing or by the expedient of control. If these issues are
resolved, the bankruptcies of virtual worlds will not serve merely as a testament
to the difficulties entrepreneurs face in bringing a product to market. Rather,
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